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We derive aggregate growth-accounting implications for a two-sector economy with heterogeneous
capital subsidies and monopoly power. In this economy, measures of total factor productivity (TFP)
growth in terms of quantities (the primal) and real factor prices (the dual) can diverge from each other
as well as from true technology growth. These distortions potentially give rise to dynamic reallocation
eIIects that imply that change in technology needs to be measured from the bottom up rather than the
top down. We show an example, for Singapore, of how incomplete data can be used to obtain estimates
of aggregate and sectoral technology growth as well as reallocation eIIects. We also apply our framework
to reconcile divergent TFP estimates in Singapore and to resolve other empirical puzzles regarding
Asian development.
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Many countries￿ rich and poor, fast growing and slow￿ have market distortions that a⁄ect the
economic interpretation of productivity statistics. Some distortions re￿ ect intentional government
policies such as capital subsidies or preferential tax treatment that favor particular ￿rms or ac-
tivities. Others re￿ ect monopoly power that can lead to pure economic pro￿t. These distortions,
in theory and practice, in￿ uence measures of total factor productivity in terms of quantities (the
primal approach) and real factor prices (the dual). We derive aggregate growth accounting im-
plications for a two-sector economy with heterogeneous capital subsidies and monopoly power. In
this economy, measures of primal and dual TFP growth can diverge from each other and from true
technology growth.
One set of distortions arises from policy interventions. Favored producers might receive subsi-
dized ￿nancing or preferential tax treatment; foreign ￿rms might be o⁄ered bene￿ts to encourage
direct investment. Subsidies and bene￿ts are often di¢ cult to quantify and can lead the actual user
cost of capital to diverge from measures observed by a statistician. Even at a ￿rm level, measured
dual TFP growth, which is based on changes in real factor payments, will then not generally equal
true technology growth; primal TFP growth, in contrast, does not directly use the measured cost
of capital and is less sensitive to this unobserved favoritism.
A second set of distortions re￿ ects monopoly power. Such monopoly power might re￿ ect entry
barriers that protect powerful incumbents or state-owned ￿rms, leading prices to be a markup over
marginal cost. Markups also cause problems for measurement because they drive a wedge between
observed factor shares in revenues and output elasticities. For example, in the two-factor case with
constant returns to scale, the labor elasticity of output is measured as labor￿ s share of revenues
and the capital elasticity of output can be inferred as the residual share. But economic pro￿ts
break both of these relationships. The monopoly wedge generally implies, again, that measures of
￿rm-level dual and primal TFP growth di⁄er from each other and from technology growth.
Unobserved heterogeneity across producers with respect to both of these distortions causes ad-
ditional problems. In our two-sector framework, aggregate technology cannot generally be obtained
from aggregate data alone; it is necessary to build from the bottom up. The reason is that aggre-
gate TFP estimates in this economy potentially include reallocation e⁄ects, since the same factor of
production has a di⁄erent social valuation in di⁄erent uses. These e⁄ects, which re￿ ect how capital
market and other distortions in￿ uence the measured growth rate of TFP relative to technology, are
1the dynamic analog to the e⁄ect of misallocations in the cross-section and the resulting reduction
in the aggregate level of TFP focused on in recent papers.1
We apply our framework to Singapore, a prominent puzzle in growth accounting. Young￿ s (1992,
1994, 1995) careful primal growth accounting established the conventional wisdom that Singapore￿ s
rapid development did not involve TFP growth. Two decades of growth of nearly 8 percent per
year re￿ ected massive accumulation of capital and labor along with negative TFP growth. Hsieh￿ s
(2002) dual TFP accounting challenged this view, ￿nding that TFP grew at a moderate positive
pace. Table 1 compares these primal and dual estimates for Singapore as well as the other newly
industrialized economies (NIEs) of Hong Kong, Korea, and Taiwan. The con￿ icting results for
Singapore re￿ ect the following puzzle. Labor￿ s share in income was generally stable or rising.
Hence, the rising capital-output ratio behind the weak primal TFP growth in Singapore implies a
sharp decline in returns to capital; but, reasonable user-cost measures are ￿ at.
We provide qualitative and quantitative evidence that capital subsidies, di⁄erential tax treat-
ment, and pure pro￿ts played an important role in Singapore￿ s economy. This is an example of a
very successful economy that had the types of distortions we discuss. Our theoretical framework
implies that, to measure technology, we in principal need to build from the bottom up￿ ￿ measuring
technology separately for the favored and unfavored sectors. A challenge is that the detailed data
necessary to do these computations directly do not exist. However, we show how to combine partial
and incomplete data to measure aggregate technology as distinct from standard TFP, which may
include reallocation and other e⁄ects.
Our results suggest that, for ￿rms receiving preferential treatment, even Young￿ s primal results
were insu¢ ciently pessimistic: Output grew nearly 10 percent per year for two decades, with
negative technology growth. Since this sector received large quantities of foreign direct investment,
our results suggest that policies designed to lure FDI did not, in fact, raise the level of technology
(through technology transfer or otherwise). The unfavored sector had annual output growth of
about 6 percent with positive technology growth.
Overall, technology growth in Singapore was slightly negative and, despite sizeable distortions,
was not in fact much di⁄erent from Young￿ s primal estimates. This ￿nding has at least two impli-
cations for measurement. First, capital reallocation e⁄ects in Singapore had only a quantitatively
1The burgeoning literature on resource reallocation and misallocation includes, for example, Restuccia and Roger-
son (2009), Hsieh and Klenow (2010), and Banerjee and Moll (2010). Much of this literature focuses on developing
countries, but many of the same issues apply to rich countries. For example, Basu and Fernald (2001) emphasized
reallocations over the business cycle related to heterogeneity in factor prices and markups.
2minor impact on long-term productivity growth, despite sizeable di⁄erences across sectors in the
returns and growth rates of capital. In particular, we ￿nd that reallocation of capital towards uses
where it is less valuable (with a lower return) reduces productivity relative to technology at a rate of
about 0.1 percent per year. This ￿nding suggests that, in practice, the growth-rate implications of
the misallocation literature may, plausibly, be quite small. Second, in the case of Singapore, stan-
dard TFP estimates such as Young￿ s, which use a labor-share estimate of about 1/2, provide more
accurate estimates of technology growth than aggregate cost-based measures which, in Singapore￿ s
case, would use a labor share that is more "standard" of around 2/3. An aggregate cost-based
measure generates larger reallocation e⁄ects that boost measured productivity growth relative to
true technology growth. Hence, if one has access only to aggregate data, then "correcting" the
factor shares to better re￿ ect costs can lead to worse estimates of aggregate technology growth.
Further, we show how pure pro￿ts and unobserved heterogeneity in user costs can quantitatively
resolve the puzzling mismatch between Hsieh￿ s dual and Young￿ s primal TFP calculations for
Singapore. We replicate the exercise in the other NIEs to demonstrate that, consistent with these
previous growth accounting results, it does not imply large dual-primal TFP gaps for Hong Kong,
Korea, and Taiwan.
Finally, we note the implication of our calculations that labor￿ s share of production costs was
decreasing in most of the NIEs, despite labor￿ s ￿ at or rising share in revenue. Economic pro￿t
shares drove wedges between factor shares in revenues and in costs. Several international trade-
based descriptions of Asia￿ s growth, such as Ventura (1997) and Romalis (2004), involve structural
transformations toward capital-intensive sectors and imply a decline in labor￿ s share. Hence, in
contrast to a face-value interpretation of the original growth accounting results, our explanation
also allows an important role for trade in the NIEs￿sustained rapid growth.
In sum, we identify pitfalls in interpreting growth accounting results, and then apply our analysis
to Singapore and, to a lesser extent, the other NIEs. Section 2 considers primal and dual growth
accounting exercises with empirically prevalent distortions. Section 3 turns to the case study of
Singapore, documenting that heterogeneity in the user cost and monopoly power were important
features of that economy. Section 4 shows how to estimate technology in this economy, despite
the lack of complete data. Section 5 applies our framework more broadly to puzzles in Asia￿ s
development, including resolving the Young-Hsieh puzzle and ￿nding evidence of a shift towards
capital-intensive industries. We then conclude.
32 Growth Accounting in a Two-Sector Model with User-Cost Dif-
ferences and Pure Pro￿ts
We model a two-sector partial equilibrium environment in which one sector earns pure pro￿ts and
has cheaper access to capital (re￿ ecting capital subsidies and/or preferential tax rates). These
features are likely present in many developing and emerging economies and we later show that they
reconcile con￿ icting growth accounting estimates for Singapore. To begin, we describe the ￿rm
problem. Next, we relate measures of primal and dual TFP growth to sectoral technology growth
and to each other. Finally, we consider how measured aggregate TFP growth compares with actual
aggregate technology growth. We show that pro￿ts and unobserved heterogeneity in user costs can
drive a wedge between the dual and the primal, and render both imperfect estimates of technology
growth.
2.1 A Two-Sector Environment
Firms are indexed by i = F or U (ultimately, ￿favored￿and ￿unfavored￿ ). They use homogeneous
capital K and labor L, with Kt = KF;t + KU;t and Lt = LF;t + LU;t. Production functions are




i;t , where Ai;t is the ￿rm￿ s technology.
Firms are equity-￿nanced and seek to maximize the present discounted value of cash ￿ ows.
Cash ￿ ow each period equals after-tax revenues net of wages and capital expenditures: (1 ￿
￿i;t)(Pi;t (Yi;t)Yi;t ￿ WtLi;t) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿i;t ￿ ￿i;tDi;t)qtIi;t. Firms take the wage, Wt, as given and
deduct wage payments before paying taxes at rate ￿i;t. qt is the price of capital goods. Di;t is the
present value of depreciation allowances in the tax code per dollar of investment, and is paid as an
immediate tax credit.2 ￿i;t is an investment subsidy, so that (1 ￿ ￿i;t ￿ ￿i;tDi;t)qtIi;t is the ￿rm￿ s
e⁄ective net expenditure on capital. If the ￿rm has market power, then price Pi;t depends on its





is the ￿rm￿ s discount rate from period 0 to period t (with ￿0 ￿ 0) .










((1 ￿ ￿i;t)(Pi;t (Yi;t)Yi;t ￿ WtLi;t) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿i;t ￿ ￿i;tDi;t)qtIi;t);
subject to initial capital Ki;0, the production function, and the constraint that capital input depends
2With constant tax rates, this formulation is equivalent to allowing ￿rms to deduct depreciation each period
against income before paying taxes. Di;t is the present value of these deductions.
4on investment Ii;t and depreciation ￿: Ki;t+1 = (1 ￿ ￿)Ki;t + Ii;t.
The ￿rst-order condition for labor yields that the output elasticity is a markup ￿i;t over the
share of payments to labor in total revenue, sLi;t (see, e.g., Hall 1990):




where ￿i;t = (1 + (@Pi;t=@Yi;t)(Yi;t=Pi;t))
￿1. With perfect competition, price is not a⁄ected by the
￿rm￿ s output, so ￿i;t = 1. Similarly, the Euler equation for capital implies that the output elasticity
is a markup over the share of payments to capital in total revenue, ￿i = ￿i;t (Ri;tKi;t)=(Pi;tYi;t) ￿








(1 ￿ ￿i;t￿1 ￿ ￿i;t￿1Di;t￿1) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿i;t ￿ ￿i;tDi;t)
￿
qt.
Let b j = dJ=J be the percent change in variable J, so that (1 + ￿t)=(qt=qt￿1) ￿ 1+￿t ￿ b qt. If ￿iDi
and ￿i are constant between t ￿ 1 and t, then Ri;t takes the familiar form:3
Ri;t = (￿t + ￿ ￿ b qt)
￿
1 ￿ ￿i;t ￿ ￿i;tDi;t
1 ￿ ￿i;t
￿
qt ￿ (￿t + ￿ ￿ b qt)Ti;tqt;
where Ti is a wedge from taxes, capital subsidies, and depreciation allowances.
The user cost is the implicit cost of using or renting capital for one period; it is capital￿ s
counterpart to the wage. The ￿rm must earn an after-tax return to cover interest plus depreciation.
The wedge Ti captures taxes or subsidies that a⁄ect the pre-tax return the ￿rm must earn to achieve
this after-tax return. The purchase price of capital is e⁄ectively (1 ￿ ￿i;t ￿ ￿i;tDi;t)qt, so reducing
investment subsidies or depreciation allowances raises the user cost, as does increasing ￿i.
Instantaneous economic pro￿ts are:
￿t;i = Pt;iYt;i ￿ Rt;iKt;i ￿ WtLt;i: (2)




=￿t;i. With constant returns,
a markup ￿t;i > 1 leads to pure pro￿ts. Henceforth, when possible, we omit time subscripts.
3See Hall and Jorgenson (1967). Auerbach (1983) and Hassett and Hubbard (2002) survey the vast literature on
the user cost. Personal taxes a⁄ect capital taxation but not the user cost if ￿rms take the interest rate as given. We
have abstracted from property taxes. These were unimportant in Korea and Hong Kong, and moved over time with
corporate tax rates in Singapore and Taiwan; see Asher (1989) and Tanzi and Shome (1992).
52.2 Recovering Technology Growth with the Primal and Dual
Di⁄erentiating the production function, sectoral technology growth from the primal (quantities) is:
b ai = b yi ￿ ￿ib ki ￿ (1 ￿ ￿i)b li: (3)
From the ￿rst-order conditions, the weights are factor shares in cost: ￿i = RiKi=(RiKi + WiLi).
The dual approach also requires factor shares, but uses them to weight growth of real factor
prices rather than factor quantities. Di⁄erentiating (2), substituting in relation (3), and rearranging
terms yields sectoral technology growth as:




where b s￿i = b ￿i ￿ b pi ￿ b yi is the growth rate of sector i￿ s pro￿t share. Intuitively, if technology
improves then someone gets paid more per unit of output￿ either a factor of production (labor or
capital), or the owners of the ￿rm. In principal, estimates of the growth in the user cost (b rDual)
and wage (b wDual) might come from data independent of the national accounts. If the statistician
accurately estimates the cost-shares ￿i, correctly measures factor price growth (including taking
into account the tax wedge Ti, so that b rDual = b ri and b wDual = b wi), and has an accurate measure
of the level and growth of pro￿t￿ s share, she would correctly estimate sectoral technology growth.
Growth in aggregate output, technology, and measured TFP re￿ ect these sectoral values. The
Divisia index of aggregate output growth is share-weighted sectoral growth: b y ￿ !Fb yF + !Ub yU,
where the nominal output share of sector i is !i ￿ PiYi=(PFYF + PUYU) ￿ PiYi=PY . (Aggregating
output with nominal output shares is sensible since these shares re￿ ect relative prices, which are
generally equated to purchasers￿relative valuations.) With Cobb-Douglas production functions:
b y = (!Fb aF + !Ub aU) +
￿




!F (1 ￿ ￿F)b lF + !U (1 ￿ ￿U)b lU
￿
.
The ￿rst term, b a ￿ !Fb aF +!Ub aU, tells us how much aggregate output rises because of technological
change, holding labor and capital in the two sectors ￿xed (so that the second and third terms are
zero). Given this property, it is a natural measure of aggregate (and average) technology change.
In general, as we discuss in the next subsection, it needs to be calculated from the "bottom up,"
using sectoral technology estimates performed as in (3) or (4).
62.3 Pitfalls in Standard Growth Accounting Approaches
TFP estimates capture more than just technology, whether at a sectoral or an aggregate level.
Standard primal TFP growth is ordinarily de￿ned using labor￿ s share of revenue, sLi, rather than
shares in cost, to weight input growth. At a sectoral level:
d TFPPrimal;i ￿ b yi ￿ (1 ￿ sLi)b ki ￿ sLib li: (5)
The share of payments to labor sLi is easiest to measure so capital￿ s weight is a residual (1 ￿ sLi).
If ￿rms have market power, ￿i > 1, the primal TFP calculation (5) does not, in general, equal
technology change b ai. In particular, from (3) and the ￿rst-order conditions, we ￿nd:
b ai = d TFPPrimal;i + (￿i ￿ 1)sLi
￿
b ki ￿b li
￿
.
With pure pro￿ts, labor￿ s revenue share overweights capital and underweights labor (see Hall, 1990).
If capital grows faster than labor, then technology growth exceeds measured primal TFP growth.
Now consider dual (factor price) estimates. As a benchmark, suppose the statistician uses the
same data as the primal (namely, nominal and real output, wage and labor input, and capital
input) but cannot distinguish economic pro￿ts per unit of capital in sector i, ￿i=Ki, from the user
cost, Ri. A natural implied "dual" return on capital would take payments to capital as a residual,
yielding a return of (PiYi ￿ WLi)=Ki = (Ri + ￿i=Ki). Then, totally di⁄erentiating the accounting
identity that Pt;iYt;i = WtLt;i + (Ri + ￿i=Ki)Kt;i and rearranging yields:
b yi ￿ sLib li ￿ (1 ￿ sLi) b ki = sLi (b w ￿ b pi) + (1 ￿ sLi)
￿
d (ri + ￿i=ki) ￿ b pi
￿
: (6)
The left-hand side is primal TFP growth from (5). Equation (6) thus shows that standard TFP
growth can be estimated either from quantities or from share-weighted growth in real factor prices
(the dual). If the data satisfy the accounting identity (i.e., they are internally consistent), then the
results are identical. If ￿i;t > 1, then neither estimate, in general, equals technology growth.
Of course, the dual approach is useful if factor-price data are more easily available (or considered
more reliable) than quantity data. Following Hsieh (2002), suppose the statistician continues to
use sLi and (1 ￿ sLi) as weights and assumes away the import of (or cannot observe) taxes and
subsidies. She measures the user cost for all ￿rms as RDual;i = RDual = (￿ + ￿ ￿ b q)q. ￿ is some
market rate, such as a bank rate. Even if ￿ appropriately measures the ￿rm￿ s discount rate, the
7user-cost estimate still di⁄ers from the ￿rm￿ s true user cost due to the tax/subsidy wedge; Ti, and
so the statistician incorrectly estimates growth in this cost: b rDual;i = b ri￿ b ti. In such a case, and
assuming b wDual = b w, it can be shown that:
d TFPDual;i ￿ (1 ￿ sLi)(b rDual;i ￿ b pi) ￿ sLi (b w ￿ b pi)
= b ai (1 ￿ s￿i) ￿ s￿i b ￿i ￿ (1 ￿ s￿i)(1 ￿ ￿i)b ti:
If pro￿ts are always zero and Ti is constant, then dual TFP growth equals technology growth. If
either of these conditions fails, it does not.
The pitfalls so far refer to estimates with sectoral (or industry) data. But TFP estimates often
use aggregate output and inputs￿ re￿ ecting data availability as well as a desire for simple summary
statistics (e.g., for cross-country comparisons). In distorted economies, measures of aggregate TFP
capture resource reallocations as well as technology. Suppose the unfavored sector is perfectly
competitive, but the favored sector F charges a markup ￿F > 1 and may receive a capital subsidy
or favorable tax treatment (so TF < TU). Some algebra (see Appendix A) shows that standard
TFP growth (equation (5), calculated with aggregate data) is:
d TFP ￿ b y ￿ (1 ￿ sL)b k ￿ sLb l = b a + s￿
￿
b xF ￿ b k
￿
+ ￿K: (7)
b xF = ￿Fb kF + (1 ￿ ￿F)b lF is cost-share-weighted inputs in the favored sector. s￿
￿
b xF ￿ b k
￿
re￿ ects
the net e⁄ect of two channels by which markups a⁄ect aggregate TFP growth. First, with markups,
a factor￿ s output elasticity in the favored sector exceeds its share in revenue (see, e.g., equation (1)).
Hence, this calculation does not fully account for the productive contribution of favored inputs,
with undermeasurement of s￿b xF. Second, standard TFP subtracts o⁄ (1 ￿ sL)b k = (sK + s￿)b k.
The s￿b k portion does not re￿ ect capital￿ s marginal product, so it is added back.












b kF ￿ b kU
￿
;
is a capital reallocation term: reallocating capital to sectors with higher user costs raises measured
TFP relative to technology. Other things equal, a higher user cost implies a higher value of
the marginal product of capital. Shifting capital to where it￿ s more valuable raises output and
productivity, even if technology and total inputs remain constant.
8At a sectoral level, a cost-based residual would appropriately measure technology, as equation (3)
shows. But at an aggregate level, cost-based aggregate TFP growth also does not equal technology
growth because of reallocation e⁄ects. Appendix A shows that:
b y ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)b l ￿ ￿b k = b a +
s￿
1 ￿ s￿




The capital-reallocation term in (8) is a scaled-up version of the capital-reallocation term in (7).
The "pro￿ts reallocation" term takes a di⁄erent form, however, and re￿ ects that output growth is
aggregated using shares in total nominal output, whereas a cost-based residual e⁄ectively aggregates
inputs using shares in total cost. Some algebra (see Appendix) shows that s￿(1 ￿ !F)=(1 ￿ s￿) is
the di⁄erence between the share of the favored sector in output, !F, and its share in costs. This
wedge is large if pro￿ts (earned only in the favored sector) are large, but it is small if the favored
sector is already a large share of the economy; intuitively, as the favored sector￿ s share of output
goes to its upper bound of one, the wedge between output and cost shares in the favored sector
necessarily goes to zero. The pro￿ts-reallocation term implies that shifting resources towards the
favored sector￿ where markups and pro￿ts are high￿ raises aggregate output and the cost-based
residual, even if aggregate inputs don￿ t change.4
Using the dual doesn￿ t simplify the aggregation problem. Consider a counter example. Suppose
￿U = ￿F and that the measured user cost and wages correspond to the unfavored sector. Then, a
cost-based "aggregate" dual residual gives technology growth in that sector alone, irrespective of
what is happening to favored technology.
The reallocation terms in (7) and (8) are the dynamic counterparts of the levels e⁄ects identi￿ed
in the misallocation literature (e.g., Hsieh and Klenow, 2010). In order to do counterfactuals (such
as asking what would happen if a distortion were eliminated), one needs the full general equilibrium
model. For historical growth accounting, in contrast, one needs weaker assumptions, since (condi-
tional on given distortions) equilibrium prices and quantities are observed. In particular, we need
assumptions only about the production side of the problem to obtain a set of ￿rst-order conditions
that allow us to interpret quantity changes; we do not need to make assumptions about the rest of
the model. (The "cost" of using these weaker assumptions is that we cannot do counterfactuals).
The misallocation literature emphasizes how favoritism can reduce the level of productivity.
Hsieh and Klenow, for example, focus on favorable access to capital. In growth rate terms, if
4A complementary intuition comes from noting that monopolists produce too little from a social perspective.
Shifting resources towards a sector that underproduces raises aggregate output (and, generally, welfare).
9favoritism not only leads to RF < RU but also leads to faster growth in favored capital
￿
b kF > b kU
￿
,
then ￿K is negative. Other things equal, measured TFP falls relative to technology. The discussion
above also highlights an additional e⁄ect, which plausibly works in the opposite direction. In our
model, favored ￿rms have monopoly power and underproduce. If these ￿rms increase inputs more
quickly (relative to b k, with standard TFP; or relative to b xU with cost-based TFP), then measured
productivity rises. Hence, policies that encourage the growth of monopoly ￿rms reduce an existing
distortion. The net e⁄ect of these two terms on measured TFP growth is uncertain. In particular,
if capital subsidies work to systematically shift resources towards the pro￿table, favored sector,
then the pro￿ts term might plausibly be positive even though the capital-reallocation term ￿K is
negative.
The major conclusions from this section are that, with signi￿cant and di⁄erent distortions
across sectors, estimating technology growth in principal requires building from the bottom up.
Simple ￿xes￿ such as using cost-shares rather than revenue-shares, or doing dual rather than primal
growth accounting￿ do not allow us to sidestep the aggregation issues. Sectoral distortions imply
that observed factor-price data may be unrepresentative of the aggregate economy and create
the possibility that reallocations a⁄ect aggregate productivity growth. Distinguishing technology
change from these reallocations requires controlling for the distortions at a disaggregated level.
3 Pro￿ts and User-Cost Di⁄erences in Singapore
The model suggests features of economies that can theoretically cause primal and dual TFP cal-
culations to diverge from each other as well as from technology growth. Singapore provides an
interesting case study because of its enormous success in economic development as well as the
controversy over the role of TFP growth in this development. This section documents that the
distortions identi￿ed in the model matter in practice for Singapore.
Virtually every description of Singapore￿ s transition from a poor country in the 1960s to a rich,
modern economy cites the government￿ s active intervention and enticement of vast in￿ ows of FDI.
￿Favored￿￿rms ￿primarily government-linked corporations (GLCs), statutory boards (SBs), and
multinationals￿ bene￿ted from favorable access to capital and land, preferential tax treatment, and
earned large pro￿ts.5 Incentives, including tax preferences, increased over time.
5SBs are created by acts of Parliament and are accountable to particular ministries. For example, SBs provided
utility services, telecom, and port operations. GLCs are incorporated under the Companies Act. Several state
holding companies (e.g., Temasek) hold equity on behalf of the government; Singapore￿ s Economic Development
Board sometimes takes equity stakes, as well. See Ramirez and Tan (2003) and Economist Intelligence Unit (2004).
103.1 Capital Subsidies
GLCs (where the government is a substantial shareholder) and wholly-government-controlled SBs
contributed as much as 25 percent of Singapore￿ s GDP by the late 1980￿ s.6 GLCs, SBs, and
multinationals had user costs of capital that likely di⁄ered from other ￿rms. Special treatment
(investment subsidies in our model) included direct government ￿nancing, implicit debt guarantees,
and political connections.7 A major bene￿t was subsidized land access. Under the Land Acquisition
Act, the government had authority to purchase land at its 1973 market price, which it leased to
industrialists at rates that re￿ ected the low acquisition price. As land prices rose, the land subsidy
grew more valuable. Favored ￿rms also received direct government credit. In the 1970s, government
loans to foreign investors, GLCs, and commercially-oriented SBs amounted to about 20 percent of
the total stock of bank loans to the private sector (these ￿gures exclude sizeable housing loans).
The average interest rate on these government commercial loans was about 3 percent less than the
bank-lending rate used in Hsieh (2002) to implement a dual TFP calculation. (In the 1980s, the
government stopped publishing the interest rate information.)8
3.2 Preferential Tax Treatment
Tax-code changes reduced the wedge Ti for all ￿rms, but more for some than for others. For example,
the statutory corporate tax rate fell from 40 percent to 33 percent in 1986 and to 32 percent in
1989.9 Figure 1A shows the statutory rate and two measures of taxes relative to income from
Inland Revenue Authority Reports and from ￿nancial reports of corporations. The three measures
all decline in the 1980s. But favored industries received much more generous tax treatment. Major
legislative changes took place under the Economic Expansion Incentives (Relief from Income Tax)
Act. The 1967 Act (as amended in 1970) gave so-called ￿pioneer ￿rms￿a ￿ve-year tax holiday, i.e.,
a tax rate of zero. In 1975, the tax-holiday period was extended to 10 years. In 1984, pioneer status
6Late 1980s share is from IMF (1995). Department of Statistics (2001) argues that by the mid-90s, the GLC share
of GDP was only a bit over 10 percent. But that calculation explicitly excludes widespread holdings of companies
where the government owns less than 20 percent. As Ramirez and Tan (2003) point out, this narrower de￿nition of
GLCs excludes many companies in which the government has e⁄ective control.
7The Economist Intelligence Unit (1993) states: ￿Singapore￿ s government relies heavily on incentives to attract
foreign investment ... Investment incentives include tax holidays and concessions, accelerated depreciation schemes,
favourable loan conditions, equity participation and high-quality industrial estates...￿ Burton (1995) claims that
GLCs￿￿costs of capital are usually lower than for companies in the private sector.￿U.S. Embassy (2001) notes that
￿GLCs were given preferential rates by DBS Bank, itself a GLC.￿
8See Appendix B for data sources. Ermisch and Hu⁄ (1999) and Tan (2001) discuss the implicit land subsidy. In
Schein￿ s (1996) case studies, negotiations between the government and foreign investors over leases for favorable land
parcels ￿gure prominently.
9Appendix B details our data sources and construction of the series in the ￿gures.
11was extended to selected service ￿rms. In 1987, Singapore reduced the tax rate for ￿rms ending
their tax-holiday period from 40 percent to 10 percent. The share of manufacturing value added
accounted for by pioneer ￿rms rose from an average of 53 percent in the ￿rst half of the 1970s to
about 64 percent in the second half of the 1980s.
Figure 1B shows that foreign manufacturing ￿rms, who were major recipients of pioneer status,
paid rates that were lower, and also fell more quickly￿ from about 40 percent to under 10 percent
by 1990. Other ￿rms￿rates fell only to about 30 percent.
3.3 Economic pro￿ts
Ermisch and Hu⁄ (1999) and the Singapore Economic Committee (1986) argue that government
SBs earned monopoly pro￿ts in public utilities and telecom. Consistent with these claims, the
"current surpluses" of commercially-oriented SBs (included in national accounting pro￿ts) averaged
13 percent of GDP during 1975-1984 and 10 percent during 1985-1988. Ramirez and Tan (2003)
￿nd that listed GLCs have statistically signi￿cantly higher q-ratios than other listed ￿rms.
Singapore￿ s active enticement of FDI in￿ ows also led to large pro￿ts. From 1972 to 1990, Singa-
pore generated FDI in￿ ows averaging almost 1/4 of gross ￿xed capital formation by o⁄ering a wide
range of incentives that reduced production costs. Singapore ￿gures prominently in the literature
on tax havens, ￿low-tax jurisdictions that provide investors opportunities for tax avoidance￿(See
Desai, Foley, and Hines, 2006). Firms might locate intangible assets in Singapore or else adjust
internal transfer prices to realize high pro￿ts there. Indeed, the average tax rate for U.S. multi-
nationals in Singapore is consistently among the lowest in the world ￿about 30 percentage points
below the unweighted mean in 1983, for example. Such pro￿t shifting, as well as other subsidies
that reduced operating costs, would lead to large reported economic pro￿ts.10
Industry estimates suggest very large pro￿ts. Kee (2002) estimates markups and returns to scale
for Singaporean manufacturing industries as in Hall (1990). She ￿nds that most industries have large
markups of price over marginal cost; but, consistent with our model, few have correspondingly large
increasing returns, implying very large pro￿ts. Indeed, in a pooled speci￿cation, Kee￿ s estimates
imply that pure pro￿ts exceed 50 percent (!) of manufacturing value-added.11
10If quantities of ￿nal output, capital, and labor are accurately measured, then "spurious" pro￿ts arising from
transfer pricing are no di⁄erent from other monopoly pro￿ts from the point of view of the model (though the
"markup" is no longer related solely to the elasticity of demand). Costs shares for capital and labor are not likely
to be a⁄ected, so a cost-based residual continues to properly measures technology; and the relationship between the
primal and dual is also not a⁄ected (Equation (4), for example, was derived from (3) and an accounting identity).
11If ￿ is the returns to scale parameter, then ￿=(PY ) = (￿ ￿ ￿)=￿. See, e.g., Basu and Fernald (2001).
12One striking piece of evidence consistent with large economic pro￿ts is Singapore￿ s low labor
share of revenue which, according to Young (1998), averaged 52 percent from 1970-90. As an
accounting identity, sL = (1 ￿ s￿)(1 ￿ ￿), where (1 ￿ ￿) is labor￿ s share in aggregate costs. For a
given ￿, as s￿ rises, labor￿ s share in revenue sL falls.
Could Young have made some mistake in calculating labor￿ s share? Appendix B explores
this hypothesis and corroborates Young￿ s low estimate of sL. In particular, since Young￿ s work,
Singapore Statistics has begun publishing data on GDP by income components (albeit starting only
in 1980). From 1980 to 1990, compensation as a share of value added averaged 45 percent. (Labor
income in these accounts includes not only wages and salaries, whether in cash or in kind, but also
pension contributions such as employers￿contributions to the Central Provident Fund and private
pension/insurance funds.) This ￿gure does not include unallocated proprietors￿income from self-
employment, which averaged 8 percent of income over this period. Any reasonable allocation of
this unallocated proprietors￿income (such as 2/3 to labor and 1/3 to capital) would imply that
labor￿ s share was, indeed, about 1/2.12
sL could be very low if production were particularly capital intensive, so that ￿ was high.
A direct check is to estimate payments to capital RK = (￿t + ￿ ￿ b qt)TtqtKt. Rotemberg and
Woodford (1995) and Basu and Fernald (2002) use this approach to estimate that U.S. pro￿ts are
low. We used investment data from the national accounts to measure qtKt and qt (see Appendix B),
Hsieh￿ s lending-rate estimate of ￿t, and an estimate of Tt (averaged across favored and unfavored
￿rms, but omitting any unobserved capital subsidies). The estimated ￿ = RK=(RK+WL) averaged
36 percent during the 1970-90 period￿ high, but far short of (1 ￿ sL). The implied pro￿t rate,
s￿ = (1 ￿ sL ￿ ￿)=(1 ￿ ￿), is 20 percent of GDP. If there were additional capital subsidies (as the
anecdotes suggest), this direct estimate of ￿ is overstated and s￿ is understated.
An alternative check on ￿ and s￿, which does not require assumptions about the appropriate
level of the user cost, comes from looking at industry structure. After all, it could be that Singapore
has a high ￿ because it specializes in capital-intensive industries. We combine national accounts
data on industry structure with international data on factor shares by industry. We assume pure
pro￿ts are relatively small in U.S. and E.U.-15 countries, and use their capital income shares
(averaged across time and across countries) as a measure of ￿j for each of the nine 1-digit industries,
12Singapore￿ s Labor Force Survey indicates that in the 1980s, about 11 percent of the labor force were either
self-employed or unpaid family workers. One way to allocate proprietors income is to assume that the these workers
earned the same average wages as employees. Then sL =0.45/(1-0.11), or 51 percent, close to Young￿ s estimate.
13j, in the United Nations International Standard Industrial Classi￿cation (ISIC).13 At least for the
U.S. and E.U., shares show modest variation over time or across countries; however, there are large
and systematic di⁄erences in shares across industries. Thus, deviations from strict Cobb-Douglas
in these data appear small relative to mean di⁄erences across industries. (Note that, if U.S. or E.U.
industries earn pure pro￿ts, then using their factor shares as a benchmark will lead to estimates
that understate pro￿ts in the NIEs.)
Table 2 shows results from this "industry structure" approach. Lines 1 and 2 show the level
and growth in the "residual" share of capital and pro￿ts in revenues, (1 ￿ sL), as used by Young




j , where !C
j = (WLj+RjKj)=
P
j(WLj+RjKj) is an estimate of industry j￿ s share of
total costs. Line 7 gives the implied pro￿t rate, s￿ = (1 ￿ sL ￿ ￿)=(1 ￿ ￿). The estimated "true"
capital revenue share sK, line 5, is the di⁄erence between the share of capital plus pro￿t (line 1)
and the pro￿t share (line 7).
Estimating industry shares in total cost require assumptions about the distribution of pro￿ts.
If the pro￿t rate is equal across sectors, then !C
j = !j, the industry￿ s observed share of GDP.
For Singapore, the ￿rst column of results makes this assumption. The anecdotal evidence above,
however, suggests that some but not all industries earned pro￿ts. The second column of results
assumes that only some favored industries earn pro￿ts (albeit with all favored industries having
the same pro￿t rate). We defer discussion of the speci￿c assumptions made (including the industry
breakdown) until Section 4.1. The di⁄erences between these two columns re￿ ects that favored
industries (and thus, by assumption the more pro￿table ones) were also more capital intensive.
Hence, the capital-intensive industries receive a lower weight in aggregate cost !C
j in the second
13We obtain industry factor shares from the EU KLEMS Growth and Productivity Accounts. These accounts
provide consistent data for cross-country productivity comparisons, with industry measures of output, inputs, and
factor payments from 1970-2005 for the United States, Japan, a number of European Union countries and several
other developed economies. Most of the data originate from countries￿national accounts; but they have been cleaned
and modi￿ed as part of the EU KLEMS project in order to harmonize concepts and ensure consistent de￿nitions and
treatment. See O￿ Mahony and Timmer (2009) for a detailed description of the content and methodology for the EU
KLEMS database. The EU-15 countries comprise Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. We use the March
2008 release at www.euklems.org.
For robustness, we also used industry cost-share estimates from Sarel (1997), who similarly measures capital shares
from independent international sources on industry structure. His industry-share estimates are simple averages from
26 countries, in 1980 or 1990; the countries range from very poor countries like Cameroon and Nigeria to rich countries
like the United States. The correlation between industry factor shares in EU KLEMS and Sarel is 0.94. As such, it
is not surprising that our results are highly similar using this alternative measure.
The calculations might be misleading if the product mix within one-digit industries di⁄ers from the world norm.
We obtained two-digit-manufacturing value-added data for Singapore in 1990 and applied factor shares (averaged
1980-1996) from Dale Jorgenson￿ s U.S. data. The implied manufacturing capital share was 0.32, compared with 0.34
in EU KLEMS. Product mix thus cannot explain much of a gap between (1 ￿ sL) and ￿.
14column than in the ￿rst (since some of their GDP weight, in column 1, re￿ ects pro￿ts).14 Column
2 thus has a lower aggregate ￿, which implies a higher aggregate pro￿t rate.
Either set of estimates corroborates the direct and anecdotal evidence of pure pro￿ts in Singa-
pore. Labor￿ s share is strikingly low, so the residual share (1 ￿ sL) = sK+ s￿ (line 1) is about
1/2. But our estimated capital cost share is only a bit above 1/3 (line 3), implying a pro￿t share
of about 1/4 (line 7). This large pro￿t share declined between 1 and 1.4 percent per year.
Table 2 includes, for comparison, estimates for the other NIEs, assuming an equal pro￿t share
across industries. Estimated pro￿t shares in Korea and Hong Kong are both less than 5 percent. In
Taiwan, the high labor share (about 3/4, from Young, 1995) implies a negative pro￿t share. How-
ever, Young (2003) argues that his original labor-share estimate is too high because it inadvertently
overadjusts for (imputed) proprietor￿ s wage income; he does not provide a corrected ￿gure. Thus,
we interpret the Taiwan, Korea, and Hong Kong results as consistent with small pure pro￿ts.
In sum, quantitative approaches corroborate the anecdotal reports that Singapore had excep-
tionally large pure pro￿ts.15
4 Measuring and Interpreting Technology Growth in Singapore
We now assess technology change in Singapore and, as a by-product, describe the evolution of the
two sectors and the aggregate economy. Section 2 emphasized that when sectors are heterogeneous,
we need to measure technology from the bottom up. The main measurement challenge is the lack
of direct data on inputs for the favored and unfavored sectors (Young, 1994, discusses this lack of
reliable industry data). We show how to use partial data on the two sectors to derive appropriate
estimates.
4.1 Measuring Technology
We estimate sectoral and aggregate technology by combining the relationships from Section 2 with
a range of other data sources, including Young￿ s (1995, 1998) primal, Hsieh￿ s (2002) dual, our own
14If pro￿t shares are equated across industries within the pro￿t-making favored sector, then￿ within the favored
and unfavored sectors separately￿ shares in output correspond to shares in cost. We can then estimate ￿F and ￿U.
Section 4.1 describes how we estimate sectoral labor shares. Given the sL;F and ￿F, we can obtain s￿;F. s￿ is then
!Fs￿;F .
15Studies for other countries also sometimes suggest that product market distortions lead to substantial economic
rents. Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) discuss the sharp decline in labor￿ s income share in some European economies
from the early 1980s to the mid-1990s; in Italy, for example, labor￿ s share fell from almost 80 to about 60 percent.
They attribute the decline to labor￿ s reduced ability to capture the rents arising from product market restrictions.
Such a large shift in rents implies that the rents themselves must be large.
15measurements of Singapore￿ s market imperfections from Section 3, and the national accounts.
To preview, the key assumption is that the unfavored sector is perfectly competitive and receives
no unobserved subsidies. Hence, the dual (with appropriate real factor prices and factor shares)
accurately measures unfavored technology growth. We also assume that particular one-digit in-
dustries, for which we have national accounts data on output and prices as well as international
data on factor shares, correspond to this competitive sector. We can then use these data to infer
unfavored labor and capital growth that are consistent with the dual. In the favored sector, im-
perfect competition and unmeasured capital subsidies drive a wedge between standard measures of
primal or dual TFP and technology. But we can use the estimates of unfavored inputs along with
aggregate accounting relationships for capital and labor to back out favored inputs; the cost-based
primal (3) then gives technology. Throughout, we assume that capital and labor are homogenous
(which simpli￿es aggregate relationships) and that the nominal wage is equalized across sectors.
How do we apply these assumptions? First, we allocate one-digit ISIC industries wholesale to
either the favored or the unfavored sectors. Note that, if the allocation is unclear, we want to
err on the side of over-allocating to the favored sector, to ensure that the unfavored sector truly
is competitive. In contrast, inappropriately including some competitive, unsubsidized activities
in the favored sector might induce some reallocation e⁄ects within that sector, but are unlikely
to substantially a⁄ect interpretation. The anecdotal evidence from Section 3 suggests that the
favored sector comprised all or parts of the following industries: Manufacturing, Finance, Utilities,
and Transport. The remaining sectors received little, if any, favorable treatment and we identify
them with the unfavored sector: Agriculture and Fishing, Quarrying, Construction, Commerce,
and Other Services. With this industry classi￿cation, the favored sector accounted on average for
!F =59 percent of output, and grew notably faster: From 1970-90, b yF averaged 9.6 percent, and
b yU averaged 6.1 percent.
Second, as in Section 3.3, we assume Singapore￿ s cost shares at the one-digit industry level
equal the averages of U.S. and E.U.-15 industry factor shares taken from EU KLEMS. Given
the industry decomposition, this assumption implies that unfavored industries are labor intensive:
output-share-weighted ￿U is only 23 percent, whereas ￿F is 41 percent. Finally, for the sake of
clarity and transparency, the discussion generally assumes that we can manipulate identities using
average nominal shares (e.g., of favored and unfavored output) calculated over decades, even though
the shares may be changing year-to-year. (Allowing for changing shares￿ i.e., doing all calculations
year-by-year and then averaging across years￿ makes relatively little di⁄erence to results.)
16In the competitive and unsubsidized unfavored sector, dual TFP growth (4) equals technology
growth. Calculating the dual requires three things: capital￿ s share of the sector￿ s costs (￿U =
0:23), nominal wage growth de￿ ated by the sectoral price index (b w ￿ b pU), and the unfavored user
cost of capital de￿ ated by the sectoral price index (b rU ￿ b pU). Growth in real aggregate wages is
b w ￿ b p = b sL + b y ￿b l = 2:1 percent, where we take growth in output b y, labor￿ s share b sL, and labor b l
from Young (1998). We then solve for b w ￿ b pU = (b w ￿ b p) + (b p ￿ b pU) = 1:9 percent, using sectoral
and aggregate price de￿ ators from the national accounts.16 Finally, we measure b rU by averaging
two of Hsieh￿ s (2002) estimates of the real user cost, b rHsieh ￿ b p, that are based on the bank lending
rate and the earnings-price ratio.17 (We omit Hsieh￿ s third estimate, which uses return-on-equity
(ROE) data since, as we discuss below, we question the reliability of the ROE data; we show in a
robustness test in Table 3 that this makes little qualitative or quantitative di⁄erence.)
Hsieh explicitly ignored taxes and depreciation allowances, which potentially drive a wedge
between observed b rDual and the actual change in unfavored user costs c rU. We use the data in
Figure 1a along with estimates from the tax code on the present value of depreciation allowances,
DU, to calculate the unfavored tax wedge Tu = (1 ￿ ￿UDU)=(1 ￿ ￿U) under the assumption there
are no unobserved subsidies in the unfavored sector (see Appendix B). Tu declined over time,
re￿ ecting both a decline in the statutory tax rate from 0.40 to 0.32, and an increase in the present
value of depreciation allowances from about 0.6 before 1977 to about 0.75 after 1979. Together,
the tax wedge for ￿rms paying the statutory rate fell 0.7 percent per year, i.e. b tU = ￿0:7.
Combining Hsieh￿ s user-cost estimates, our tax calculation, and the national accounts measure
of the relative price yields: b rU ￿ b pU = (b rHsieh ￿ b p) + (b p ￿ b pU) + b tU = 0:6 ￿ 0:1 ￿ 0:7 = ￿0:2.
We now have all the elements required to calculate unfavored technology growth in (4):
b aU = (1 ￿ ￿U)(b w ￿ b pU) + ￿U (b rU ￿ b pU)
= (0:77)(1:9) + (0:23)(￿0:2) = 1:5 percent.
To measure favored sector technology, we use the cost-based primal, equation (3). As noted, b yF
is 9.6 percent and ￿F is 41 percent. We also need growth in the sector￿ s inputs, b kF and b lF. To solve
for these values, we ￿rst estimate their counterparts in the unfavored sector, b kU and b lU. We then
use the adding-up identities b l = (LF=L)b lF +(1 ￿ LF=L)b lU and b k = (KF=K)b kF +(1 ￿ KF=K)b kU,
16To best preserve comparability of our estimates with Young, we use his measure of wage growth but could
alternatively have used Hsieh￿ s direct estimates.
17The measures cover di⁄erent years. We weight by number of years covered to approximate the 1970-1990 period.
17which in turn require estimates of (LF=L) and (KF=K).
Starting with unfavored labor growth, we use the relationship b lU = b yU + b sLU ￿ (b w ￿ b pU),
where all terms on the right hand side have been described and quanti￿ed above. With zero
pro￿ts in the competitive unfavored sector, growth in labor￿ s share of revenues is b sLU = d (1 ￿ ￿U),
where the unfavored capital share in costs used the EU KLEMS sectoral data.18 This gives b lU =
6:1+0:0￿1:9 = 4:2 percent per year. Turning to unfavored capital, an identical procedure generates
b kU = 6:1 percent per year.19
Finally, turning to the adding-up identities, we need estimates of (LF=L) and (KF=K). We
start by estimating labor￿ s share of revenue in the favored sector from the implicit relationship:
sL = !FsLF + (1 ￿ !F)sLU. We have data on all terms other than sLF, so the equation implies
that labor￿ s share of revenues in the favored sector is 34 percent. Although this share may seem
low, it exactly matches labor￿ s share of value added for U.S. multinationals which, according to
U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis data, was also 34 percent from 1983-1998). Since the wage is














which implies that (LF=L) = 0:39. Thus, although the favored sector is larger, its low labor intensity
implies that the unfavored sector employs more workers. Finally, combining the sectoral shares of
the total labor force with the aggregate labor growth estimate in Young (1995), b l = 6:2, implies
(from the adding-up identity) that b lF = 9:4 percent.
For capital, the calibration is more complicated, since user costs aren￿ t equated across sectors.
We obtain a benchmark by de￿ning the user-cost ratio ￿ = RF=RU < 1, the capital stock ratio















Appendix B details our estimates that RU=q averages about 13.0 percent and RF=q averages about
9.2 percent (re￿ ecting subsidized capital and preferential tax treatment) . Thus, ￿ = RF=RU =
0:71, which implies ￿ = 2:1 and KF=K = ￿=(1 + ￿) = 0:68: Given aggregate b k = 10:9 and
18Given the Cobb-Douglas assumption for one-digit industries, the only reason the unfavored share sL;U would
change is if the mix of industries with the unfavored sector changed; such variation is small.
19We also now have the information to calculate unfavored technology using the primal. The result is the same as
the dual calculation: 6.1-0.81*4.2-0.19*6.1=1.5 percent.
18b kU = 6:1;we ￿nd b kF =
￿
b k(1 + ￿) ￿ b kU
￿
=￿ = 13:1 percent.20
The cost-based primal, (3), now gives favored technology growth, b aF:
b aF = b yF ￿ ￿Fb kF ￿ (1 ￿ ￿F)b lF
= 9:6 ￿ (0:41)(13:1) ￿ (0:59)(9:4) = ￿1:3 percent.
Thus, the favored sector was growing nearly 10 percent a year, with falling technology.21
In a proximate sense, the negative technological growth re￿ ects the rapid growth in favored
inputs, especially capital. Aggregate technology growth is the output-share-weighted sum of tech-
nology growth in the two sectors: b a = !Ub aU + !Fb aF. Column 1 of Table 3 shows that with
b aF = ￿1:3, b aU = 1:5, and !F = 0:59, b a is -0.2 percent per year.
Technology growth is only 0.1 percentage point per year stronger than the primal estimate of
negative TFP growth. (Our primal TFP ￿gure di⁄ers very slightly from Young￿ s original TFP
results because of minor di⁄erences in aggregate output growth in his vintage of data and ours.)
From (7), we know that d TFPPrimal￿b a = s￿
￿
b xF ￿ b k
￿
+￿K, and we can use the above calculations
to verify that s￿
￿
b xF ￿ b k
￿
is negligibly small￿ both cost-weighted favored inputs and aggregate
capital were rising at about 10.9 percent per year. ￿K is about ￿0:1.22 Despite the massive scale
of the distortions in Singapore￿ s economy, including a 30 percent gap in favored and unfavored user
costs with large di⁄erences in growth rates between favored and unfavored capital, the dynamics of
these distortion terms do not contribute much to the long-term evolution of aggregate TFP growth.
Loosely speaking, the reallocation terms are second-order￿ they involve the product of di⁄erences
in growth rates and di⁄erences in user costs, which tends to make them small.
For our baseline case in Singapore, the standard Solow residual thus turns out to be a close
approximation to technology change, at least when averaged over a period of several decades.
Interestingly, using an aggregate cost-based residual￿ weighting labor with its aggregate cost share
of 0.68 and capital with its cost share of 0.32￿ would yield positive TFP growth of 0.5 percent
20The log change in RK can be written as: d (RK) =   d (RUKU) + (1 ￿  ) d (RFKF), where   = 1=(1 + ￿￿). This
equation can also be solved for ￿￿, and does not yield the same value as (9) ￿our calibration is, loosely speaking,
overidenti￿ed. But the two estimates are in fact quite close ￿they take values of 1.5 (in text) and 1.3 (in footnote).
In essence, our story is not consistent with any arbitrary sectoral de￿nitions. Placing manufacturing in the unfavored
sector, for example, would yield a dramatically larger discrepancy between these value. Our allocation relied on
qualitative evidence alone and allocates each industry entirely into one sector or the other, so the small di⁄erence
corroborates our calibration.
21Young (1994) ￿nds that TFP growth fell even more in manufacturing (where he is able to estimate inputs) than
in the overall economy, consistent with these estimates.
22￿K = [(KF=K)(KU=K)(RK=PY )]((RF ￿ RU)=R)
￿
b kF ￿ b kU
￿
= 0:68 ￿ 0:32 ￿ 0:24 ￿ (￿0:36) ￿ 0:07 = ￿0:0013.
19per year, which would provide a less accurate view of technology growth. The reason is that
with the dual formulation, the reallocation terms are much larger in magnitude. The capital
reallocation term, (1 ￿ s￿)
￿1 ￿K, is -0.2 percent per year; but the "pro￿ts reallocation" term
(s￿(1 ￿ !F)=(1 ￿ s￿))(b xF ￿ b xU) is 0.8 percent. Hence, it would be misleading in Singapore￿ s case
to attempt to simply adjust the aggregate shares￿ it is more accurate to use the "incorrect" sL
and (1 ￿ sL).
What key assumptions and features of the data drive these estimates? In the unfavored sector,
perfect competition, constant returns, and the lack of unobserved capital subsidies are crucial,
since they allow us to use the dual approach. The assumption of unfavored constant returns is
reasonable, given standard ￿replicability￿ arguments for competitive sectors; and the anecdotal
evidence of capital subsidies focuses almost entirely on a few domestic sectors and sectors receiving
large amounts of foreign investment. Together, this set of assumptions imply modest growth rates
of inputs in the unfavored sector. This is likely to be robust ￿nding: unfavored technology growth is
positive, which implies that favored input growth, c xU, has to be weaker than the already moderate
growth in favored output.
Conversely, the poor technology performance in the favored sector is also likely to be robust.
Modest unfavored input-growth estimates along with relatively fast overall input growth implies
that favored inputs must have grown rapidly. These, in turn, drive the weak technology performance
in the sector and overall.
Given the underlying forces in the data that drive the estimates, our quantitative and qualitative
results are not particularly sensitive to the assumptions we have made. Table 3 demonstrates the
robustness by relaxing several of the assumptions. For example, as mentioned above, our baseline
drops the ROE data￿ one of Hsieh￿ s three interest-rate measures￿ for the unfavored cost of capital.
Column 2 shows that including the ROE user-cost measure reduces b aU negligibly, since the capital-
weight is small; it slightly improves b aF (because it raises b kU and thereby reduces b kF). Column 3
substantially increases the mean ratio of favored to unfavored capital (KF=KU); this necessarily
reduces favored capital￿ s growth rate (b kF), but only slightly improves favored technology (b aF). Our
results are also robust to arbitrary reductions of the estimated pro￿t shares. Columns 4 and 5 show
results from two di⁄erent experiments that each roughly halve the average pro￿t share. In the ￿rst,
we increase the industry capital shares (relative to the EU KLEMS estimates) by 9 percentage
points in each sector, while in the second, we increasing the growth accounting labor share by 8
percentage points each year. In both of these cases, the baseline results do not change signi￿cantly.
204.2 Interpreting Negative Technology Growth
Persistently negative technological progress in the favored sector is surprising. The issue is that,
although output rose rapidly, observed inputs rose even faster. It is not simply a matter of weights
on capital and labor, since both factors rose faster than favored output.
Perhaps the most straightforward case for a negative residual is if favored returns to scale were
decreasing rather than constant. In measuring favored inputs, we assumed constant returns in the
unfavored sector but imposed no such assumption for the favored sector. Industry estimates for
other countries generally suggest constant or slightly increasing returns (e.g., Basu and Fernald,
2001, and Inklaar, 2007), making constant returns the right benchmark. However, government
interventions that limit entry could lead to decreasing returns by causing ￿rms to each overproduce,
thereby reducing the economy￿ s e¢ ciency. Consider a simple example. Suppose production requires
a ￿xed cost F and entails an increasing marginal cost: Y = X￿ ￿F, where X is a composite input,
￿ < 1, and ￿ = dlnY=dlnX = ￿(1 + F=Y ) denotes returns to scale (so ￿ < 1 implies decreasing
returns). The competitive equilibrium, where MC = AC, has constant returns to scale (￿ = 1).
Government-supported entry barriers shift the ￿rm￿ s demand curve up as well as making it less
elastic. If the upward shift dominates the reduced elasticity, then each ￿rm produces more, which
pushes ￿ < 1. Subsidies to input use also lead ￿rms to overproduce and push down ￿. In either
case, the ￿rm￿ s average cost exceeds its minimum value, so that the government interventions
reduce the e¢ ciency of the economy even if true technology does not change.23 Hence, Singapore￿ s
heavy interventions could have led to a falling cost-based TFP residual (and, therefore, reduced our
measured technology)￿ even if it favored high-productivity ￿rms. Under this interpretation, the
qualitative conclusion remains that Singapore￿ s growth was not driven by e¢ ciency improvements.
Alternatively, the economy may have shifted "too rapidly" into new products and industries,
as Young (1992) suggests. If there is an important role for learning-by-doing, as well as up-front
adoption costs, then shifting rapidly means that Singapore could have paid a lot of adoption costs
without reaping all the bene￿ts.24 Further, if government favoritism chose the wrong sectors, the
rapid gains in output might have re￿ ected high input growth that more than o⁄set the negative
technology growth, consistent with the decline in measured economic pro￿ts. In a sense, this implies
23Similarly, Restuccia and Rogerson (2004) o⁄er a story in which ￿rms have decreasing returns (e.g., from limited
managerial span of control) but di⁄er in productivity levels. Shifting resources away from the undistorted equilibrium
￿ ￿ whether towards or away from high-productivity ￿rms￿ reduces overall TFP and welfare.
24Young￿ s hypothesis would imply that Singapore adopted new technologies more rapidly than Hong Kong. But,
for electronic goods such as cell phones and personal computers, Comin and Hobijn (2010) ￿nd no evidence that
Singapore in fact adopted them more rapidly.
21that the negative reallocation e⁄ect we derived when looking across the favored and unfavored
sectors might have additionally mattered within the favored sector itself, or even internal to large
favored ￿rms. After all, our "favored sector" is a fairly crude mapping from one-digit industries,
and it is certainly not homogeneous (e.g., ￿nance is very di⁄erent from utilities).
In sum, it remains unclear what factors drove the extremely slow technology growth in Singa-
pore, though these may include decreasing returns, within-sector reallocation e⁄ects (the equivalent
of the between-sector e⁄ects we measure), and could to some extent also re￿ ect mismeasurement
(for example, we do not try to reconcile di⁄erences in estimates of Singapore￿ s wage growth). It
could be that the same policies which resulted in Singapore￿ s poor productivity performance also
led to its rapid output growth. A virtue of our measurement framework is that it makes the minimal
set of assumptions necessary for estimating technology growth as distinct from TFP growth, but it
does not allow us to perform counterfactuals. A fully-speci￿ed dynamic general equilibrium growth
model is likely needed to explore more fully how policy a⁄ected Singapore￿ s growth experience.25
5 Reconciling Empirical Puzzles Regarding Growth in Asia
Finally, we apply our framework and quanti￿cation of market imperfections to reconcile empirical
puzzles related to the rapid development of the NIEs. We start with the gap between dual and
primal TFP in Singapore and then discuss the lack of gap for other NIEs. We then note how our
quanti￿cation of pro￿t shares in the NIEs reconciles a key implication of trade-based explanations
of Asia￿ s rapid development that previously contradicted the data.
5.1 Understanding Gaps in Singapore￿ s TFP Growth Calculations
Our estimates of Singapore￿ s market imperfections quantitatively reconciles the gap between Hsieh￿ s
dual and Young￿ s primal TFP results. Manipulating equation (6) for the aggregate economy, the
di⁄erence between typical implementations of the dual and primal is:
d TFPDual ￿ d TFPPrimal = sL (b wDual ￿ b w) + (1 ￿ sL)
￿
b rDual ￿ d (r + ￿=k)
￿
. (10)
25If technology growth were so poor, then the level of technology itself ought to be relatively low. Bar-Shira et al
(2003) use a method very di⁄erent from ours to estimate levels of technology across countries. In a cross-sectional
sample of 25 countries for 1990, Singapore ranked dead last in the level of technology￿ not only below all of the other
NIEs, but below many other countries that had lower output per capita.
22If both use the same weights, then primal and dual TFP growth di⁄er only if growth in either
estimated wages or capital-payments di⁄er (given the distortions discussed above, neither measures
economy-wide technology growth).
Table 4 gives this decomposition for all the NIEs with data from Young (1995, 1998) and Hsieh
(2002). Lines 1 to 3 show the items on the right side of equation (10). Notably, line 2a shows that
Young￿ s estimates imply that real capital payments, d (r + ￿=k), fell at 3 percent per year, whereas
Hsieh￿ s dual estimate b rDual was roughly constant (rising by 0.4 percent per year). Lines 4a and 4b
show primal and dual TFP growth. Lines 5 and 6, respectively, show the contribution of wages and
capital payments to the dual-primal di⁄erence. Primal and dual TFP growth di⁄ered markedly
only in Singapore and Taiwan. Wages play a sizeable role in Singapore and account for the bulk
of the di⁄erence in Taiwan. Hsieh (2002) has little discussion of the role of wages.26 The wage
discrepancies re￿ ect measurement rather than conceptual di⁄erences.
The theoretical framework of Section 2 can explain capital￿ s contribution (line 6, which shows
the second term in (10)). In Singapore, this term accounts for the bulk of the dual-primal gap:
The weak primal TFP performance implies sharp declines in real capital payments, d (r + ￿=k), but
estimated user costs are about ￿ at. The issue, then, is to reconcile line 2a (the sharp decline in
d (r + ￿=k)) with line 2b (the ￿ at or even slightly rising b rDual).
Can the unrepresentativeness of b rDual as well as pure economic pro￿ts quantitatively reconcile
these two estimates? With some algebraic manipulation, we can write:
d (r + ￿=k) = b r +
s￿
1 ￿ sL
(b s￿ ￿ b sK): (11)
Capital payments can change either because the "average" user cost, b r; changes, or because there are
pure pro￿ts and the pro￿t rate changes relative to capital￿ s share of output. Intuitively, suppose the
user cost is constant. Then any changes in capital￿ s share are driven by changes in capital relative
to output. Thus, after stripping out growth in the user cost, the term ￿=k will increase if and only
if growth of pro￿t share exceeds that of capital share.
26The two use di⁄erent source data on wages and employment. With J types of labor, Young measures b l =
P
sjb lj.
He benchmarks to total labor compensation, which imposes the identity that WL =
P
WjLj. Hence, his estimate
of implicit real wage growth, b wPrimal ￿ b p = c sL + b y ￿ b l, is necessarily consistent with the aggregate compensation
￿gures. Hsieh measures b wDual =
P
sj b wj directly, so he doesn￿ t need to benchmark to aggregate compensation.
Implicitly, two factors ￿explain￿ the wage di⁄erences. First, Hsieh￿ s survey data have less growth in employment
than the o¢ cial tabulations and he has less implied labor quality growth than Young (1995); for given growth in
nominal compensation, these factors imply faster wage growth. Second, Hsieh￿ s ￿gures on total labor compensation
rise from 25 percent of GDP in 1973 to 37 percent of GDP in 1990. Hence, he has faster growth in nominal labor
compensation. Young (1998) questions the reliability of Hsieh￿ s wage data.













b kF ￿ b k
￿
: (12)
Growth in the aggregate user cost is a weighted average of growth in the user cost in the two sectors,
plus a reallocation term re￿ ecting that average R can fall if we capital shifts towards a sector with
a lower value of R. Hsieh￿ s dual did not incorporate any tax adjustments, so b rU = b rDual + b tU. We
additionally substitute in b rF = b rU + (b tF ￿ b tU) to write:






b kF ￿ b k
￿
;
where tax = (RFKF=RK)b tF +(RUKU=RK)b tU is the share-weighted average of growth in taxes in
the two sectors. From the tax code (see Appendix B), we can observe some portion of the tax terms
but, obviously, not unobserved subsidies to favored ￿rms. Let b tF = b tobs
F + ", where " re￿ ects the
e⁄ects of unobserved subsidies, so that we can analogously write tax = taxObs+ (RFKF=RK)".
Then:












Combining this expression with (11), we have:















Growth in payments to capital implied by the primal can di⁄er from the dual estimate because of
changes in the share-weighted growth in observed tax wedges, because of a reallocation of capital
towards sectors with di⁄erent levels of the user cost, because of pro￿ts, or because of unobserved
subsidies.
We have already discussed many of these terms, and Table 5 shows our decomposition of the
gap into each of them. Line (1) shows Hsieh￿ s b rDual of 0.4 percent per year. Line (2) shows the
share-weighted tax-wedge adjustment that we can observe, taxObs, fell about 0.9 percent per year.
To calculate this adjustment, we use our previous estimate b tU = ￿0:7. In addition, we estimate
that b tObs
F = ￿0:9.27 Given the assumptions in Section 4.1, (RFKF=RK) = ￿￿=(1 + ￿￿) = 0:60,
27This ￿gure comes from the data on tax rates for foreign manufacturing from Figure 1B, where we assume that
other ￿rms (favored or unfavored) paid the statutory tax rate. An investment allowance introduced in 1980 for some
manufacturing ￿rms made the tax code even more advantageous for favored ￿rms. (Appendix B discusses how we
24which allows us to calculate the share-weighted observable tax wedge. (Note that rounding matters.
Both b tU and b tObs
F round down, whereas taxObs rounds up.)28
Line (3) uses the benchmark estimates from Section 4.1 to obtain the reallocation term: [(RF ￿
RU)=R](KF=K)
￿
b kF ￿ b k
￿
= [(9:2 ￿ 13:0)=10:4](0:68)(13:1 ￿ 10:9) = ￿0:5 percent per year. Line
(4) uses the values from Table 2 (the second column, corresponding to our preferred two-sector
breakdown) for the pieces of the pro￿ts term, [s￿=(1 ￿ sL)][b s￿ ￿ b sK].
In principal, if there were no unobserved capital subsidies or mismeasurement, then the sum
of lines (1) through (4) would equal the primal estimate in line (6) of d (r + ￿=k) = ￿3:0 percent.
However, line (5) shows that there is a residual of 0.6 percent per year that is not yet accounted for.
In principal, that residual re￿ ects unobserved capital subsidies. There is surely further unobserved
heterogeneity in user costs￿ ￿ such as favorable access to land and ￿nancing￿ that accounts for some
if not all of this residual. In any case, the terms in our framework that we can measure explain the
bulk of the gap between the primal and dual estimates of payments to capital. (Of course, that
residual term could also capture some mismeasurement.)
This reconciliation of Hsieh￿ s dual with Young￿ s primal calculation requires that Hsieh￿ s cost
of capital measure captures the user cost for the unfavored sector only and excludes pro￿ts. Why
is this a reasonable assumption? Hsieh uses three rate-of-return measures for Singapore￿ s dual
calculation: The earnings-to-price ratio (E/P); an average lending rate; and the return on equity
(ROE). All omit subsidies and taxes, and two of the three omit pro￿ts.
First, consider the earnings-price ratio as a measure of the expected real return (￿ ￿ b q ). With
perfect capital mobility, this measure is, at best, the expected real return for the global representa-
tive investor. Such a rate might be appropriate for a ￿rm seeking private￿ sector ￿nancing (which,
presumably, many companies receiving preferential treatment did not need). But even if the listed
￿rm earned large pure pro￿ts, this raises prices as well as earnings.29
implement these and other adjustments from the tax code in order to calculate the favored tax wedge.)
28Although the decline in statutory rates was smaller than the decline in foreign manufacturing rates, the decline
in Ti was still large for ￿rms outside foreign manufacturing because of the increase in D. Note also that the declining
tax wedge is consistent with a rising corporate tax-to-GDP ratio because (corporate pro￿ts/GDP) was rising.
29There appears to be a long history in securities analysis of using the earnings-price ratio as an empirical measure
of the real discount rate, ￿￿ b p, where b p is a price de￿ ator. A standard formula (e.g., Brealey and Myers, 2000, p73)
says that a company￿ s share price is Pi = Ei=(￿ ￿ b p) + PV GOi ￿the value of a perpetuity yielding Ei, plus the
present value of growth opportunities. (The general point, of course, is that price is the present value of the stream of
dividends from the stock; but it can be useful to decompose it into a "no growth" valuation, and a separate valuation
of the growth opportunities). The equation implies that Ei=Pi = (￿￿b p)(1 ￿ PV GOi=Pi). In applying this equation
to aggregate stock-market data, Hsieh implicitly assumes that PV GOi = 0. An additional, potential, complication
is that b p might di⁄er from growth in the investment de￿ ator, b q, which is what enters the user-cost formula. This
consideration is minor for Singapore where, from 1960-95, the investment de￿ ator grew at about the same rate as
the GDP de￿ ator (structures prices grew more quickly, equipment prices more slowly).
25Second, the average bank lending rate is also more appropriate for unfavored ￿rms. Young
(1998) describes how a heavily regulated ￿cartel arrangement￿kept lending rates above competitive
levels. But GLCs, SBs, and multinationals generally had alternative, likely cheaper sources of
funding, including government loans, FDI, and international lending. In the 1980s, for example, only
21 percent of Singapore bank loans to non-bank customers went to heavily favored manufacturing,
transport, and communications industries ￿which accounted for 40 percent of GDP. FDI was a
much more important funding source for these ￿rms. In addition, ￿rm-level pro￿ts would not have
any direct e⁄ect on average lending rates.
Finally, the return on equity (ROE, from Singapore￿ s Registry of Companies and Businesses)
is the ratio of two easily manipulated elements in ￿rm ￿nancial statements￿ it is an accounting,
not a market, measure. Consider the denominator. Firms have considerable discretion in reporting
intangible assets such as goodwill or brand name, which a⁄ects the book value of shareholder equity;
￿rms earning large pro￿ts seem particularly likely to report sizeable intangible assets. From 1980-
90, the underlying asset ￿gures for non-￿nancial ￿rms alone show a ratio to GDP that averages 4.5
￿compared with a capital-output ratio of 2.8 in the national accounts.
In sum, the ROE ￿gures are not a reliable measure of the opportunity cost of funds. Indeed, if
we omit the ROE measure (as, in fact, we did in measuring technology in Section 4), then the real
dual estimate of b rD falls to +0.2 percent per year. This would reduce the primal-dual discrepancy
(line 5 of Table 5) by 0.2 percentage points.30
Our interpretation of the dual-primal divergence is more plausible than the main alternatives.
First, Hsieh suggests, with little evidence, that there were massive national accounting errors. In
particular, the national accounts might have massively overstated growth in the capital-output ratio,
either by understating output growth or overstating capital growth. We discuss this hypothesis
(and its di¢ culties) in Appendix C. Second, Young dismisses the dual calculations, in part because
they ignore key tax bene￿ts and are not appropriate for all ￿rms. We agree that these issues
are central, but ￿nd the pattern of mismeasurement economically important. The primal and dual
methods di⁄er because a subset of the economy earned very large and declining pro￿ts and received
government favoritism that grew over time.31
30Since Section 4 omitted the ROE ￿gure, lines (2) through (4) of Table 5 are una⁄ected. Instead, this modi￿cation
would reduce the residual in line (5) from 0.6 to 0.4￿ plausibly explained by land subsidies or other (growing) capital
subsidies.
31See also Feenstra and Reinsdorf (2003) and Barro (1999) for additional possible interpretations of the dual-primal
discrepancy and the implications for national accounts.
265.2 Why the Dual and Primal Calculations are Consistent in the Other NIEs
In Singapore, large but declining pro￿ts and heterogeneous costs of capital, re￿ ecting government
intervention, created the large dual-primal TFP gap. How did these factors play out in the other
NIEs? Tax e⁄ects were smaller outside of Singapore; and pro￿ts and unmeasured subsidies appear
relatively unimportant in less-interventionist Hong Kong. But Taiwan and Korea also intervened
heavily. Why is the gap so much smaller in Taiwan? Why isn￿ t there a gap in Korea?
For Taiwan, Wade (1990) documents the considerable government intervention, especially for
large ￿rms in favored sectors. Government intervention, however, does not inevitably lead to
high pro￿ts ￿Singapore is the exception to world experience, not the rule. Estimated pro￿ts in
Taiwan were small.32 Hence, capital￿ s contribution to Taiwan￿ s dual-primal gap is consistent with
unmeasured, heterogeneous, capital subsidies creating a modest gap.
Korea also intervened, but the evidence suggests it did so without creating large pro￿ts or
heterogeneity in the growth rates of the cost of capital. First, our estimates, as well as Leipziger￿ s
(1988) and Kihwan and Leipziger￿ s (1997) ￿rm-level studies, suggest small pro￿ts. Second, Hsieh
reports di⁄erent levels of the user cost using the curb loan rate (the market rate) and the discount
rate (the ￿preferred￿rate); but they move roughly in parallel.33
In addition, while FDI played a huge role in Singapore￿ s development, it had negligible impact
on Korea in the 1970￿ s and 1980￿ s. IFS statistics con￿rm that by 1990, FDI amounted to nearly half
of investment in Singapore but only 1 percent of investment in Korea. As such, the idiosyncratic,
one-time bene￿ts o⁄ered to entice FDI and leading to large pro￿ts and subsidies in Singapore had
less scope to impact growth accounting in Korea.
Finally, we ￿nd direct evidence that wedges in the cost of capital due to tax treatment were
far less important in the other NIEs. Table 6 shows that the equivalent tax adjustments (the ￿rst
term from (13)) for the other NIEs appear much smaller than in Singapore. For Taiwan, the -0.9
percentage point per year contribution largely re￿ ected increases in investment tax credits (￿) in
the 1980s. In Korea, tax rates for large companies fell over time, and depreciation allowances
became somewhat more generous. But ￿ (for selected investments) also became less generous. In
Hong Kong, the change in the tax wedge contributes nothing to the dual-primal gap: depreciation
allowances became slightly more generous over time, but the corporate tax rate also rose slightly.
32For Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Korea, the estimated contribution of pro￿ts from equation (13) is small.
33Heterogeneity can also re￿ ect di⁄erences in user-cost levels, but di⁄ering growth rates are a more direct source.
Rhee (1997) discusses the dual structure of Korea￿ s ￿nancial market.
27The second line multiplies these tax correction terms by ￿(1￿sL) to show the contribution of the
observable tax correction term to the overall dual-primal gap in measured TFP growth.
In sum, there are many similarities in the broad development strategies of Singapore, Taiwan,
and Korea. But the lack of pro￿ts and similar growth rates in favored and unfavored costs of
capital, even when taking into account tax treatment, resulted in relatively consistent dual and
primal TFP estimates outside of Singapore.
5.3 The Role of Trade and Export-Led Growth
Theories that stress the role of international trade in Asian growth predict rising capital shares
and falling labor shares. Romalis (2004) ￿nds that as the NIEs accumulated human and physical
capital, their share of world production and exports of capital-intensive goods rose and their share
of unskilled-labor-intensive production fell, implying capital￿ s share of costs rose. Ventura (1997)
extends a form of the factor-price-equalization theorem, and shows how small open economies
can sustain rapid growth without diminishing factor returns. In essence, trade in goods is an
indirect way to trade factors of production, which have diminishing returns only globally. Shifting
production toward an export sector intensive in a given factor need not imply a rapid decline in
that factor￿ s returns, so long as such exports replace use of that factor abroad.34 Since the NIEs
accumulated capital far faster than skill-adjusted labor, Ventura￿ s explanation also implies rising
capital shares and falling labor shares.35
We showed in line 2 of Table 2, however, that (1 ￿ sL) fell over time in 3 of the 4 NIEs ￿
inconsistent with Ventura￿ s predictions and surprising given Romalis￿ s results. But ￿true￿capital
shares in cost increased over time (b ￿, line 4) in 3 of the 4. Hence, in addition to reconciling disparities
between the dual and primal growth accounting results, our approach also resolves inconsistencies
between the data and key predictions of the international trade literature.
6 Conclusion
We derive aggregate growth accounting implications for a two-sector economy with two empiri-
cally prevalent distortions: heterogeneous capital subsidies and monopoly power. In this economy,
measures of primal and dual TFP growth can diverge from each other and from true technology
34Under certain conditions, Ventura￿ s factor-price equalization results imply truly constant factor prices. But his
explanation remains valid as long as factor prices decline at slower rates than factors are accumulated.
35Ventura￿ s predictions for factor shares are relative to the rest of the world. In BLS or Jorgenson data for the
United States, there is little evidence of a trend in factor shares over this period.
28growth. Further, measurement of aggregate growth in this environment re￿ ects reallocation e⁄ects
that are the dynamic counterpart of the levels e⁄ects discussed in the misallocation literature.
We discuss the case study of Singapore in more detail to illustrate some of the ways these
distortions manifest themselves. In such an economy, technology needs to be measured from the
bottom up, requiring data that aren￿ t easily available. But we show how partial and incomplete
data can be combined to measure technology and sectoral dynamics. The main empirical ￿nding is
that in Singapore, aggregate technology growth during the fastest growth decades of the 1970s and
1980s was slightly negative. Indeed, in the "favored" sector, where output grew nearly 10 percent
per year for this period, technology growth was sharply negative. Productivity growth is sometimes
de￿ned loosely as the ability to do more with less. In this sense, Singapore instead achieved less
with more!
In addition, our estimates resolve two important empirical puzzles regarding Asian development.
First, we quantitatively reconcile divergent estimates of TFP growth from the dual and primal sides.
Unmeasured heterogeneity in the cost-of-capital (re￿ ecting intentional programs to direct resources
to particular ￿rms and/or sectors) and large but declining pure economic pro￿ts explain much of
the dual-primal gap. Second, we reconcile the constant or increasing labor shares in revenue with
the intuitive story that rapid Asian growth relied heavily on a shift towards capital-intensive export
sectors. The declining pro￿t share allowed labor￿ s share to remain ￿ at or even rise despite a shift
(which we document) towards capital-intensive sectors.
Our detailed examination of the NIEs provides both important caveats to, and new applications
of, primal and dual growth accounting. When undertaking growth accounting for a country or
across countries, there is value in carefully constructing both primal and dual measures because
they are sensitive to di⁄erent distortions. Resolving discrepancies can shed light on the underlying
structure of the economy, in addition to providing insight into possible mismeasurement. Thus, this
paper reinforces the message of a growing body of empirical and theoretical work that recommends
looking inside the black box of aggregate growth accounting.
Our approach focuses on empirically relevant conditions in which, because of distortions, mea-
sured TFP diverges from technology. Our approach does not require us to specify the entire
economic environment, since it takes equilibrium allocations as observed outcomes, and then inter-
prets them with ￿rst-order conditions that would apply in many economic environments. However,
it is important to recognize that technology change is not the same thing as welfare change. To
the extent that Singapore grew rapidly￿ with rapid growth in consumption possibilities￿ because
29of its interventions, it could well have raised the welfare of its citizens.36 Understanding how the
interventions a⁄ected growth in GDP, TFP, technology, and welfare is beyond the scope of this pa-
per, and requires a fully-speci￿ed multi-sector dynamic general equilibrium model that incorporates
realistic distortions (such as government subsidies).
36Basu and Fernald (2002) discuss links between productivity residuals and welfare.
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Table 1: Asian Growth Estimates
(Percent per year)
Notes: Column (1) is average annual log-change in ￿rgdpch￿from Heston, Summers, and Aten (2002). Columns (2) and (3) are
from Young (1998) for Singapore and Young (1995) for Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Korea. For Taiwan, data exclude agriculture
and include Young￿ s adjustment of public sector output. Column (4) is from Hsieh (2002). For each economy, Hsieh o⁄ers three
or four di⁄erent measures of TFP based on di⁄erent measures of the real user cost; column (4) shows the average. Each measure
is available for slightly di⁄erent time periods; all measures approximately cover 1970 ￿1990. In columns (2) and (3), we give
the (weighted) averages across sub-periods of Young￿ s primal TFP to match the time periods for Hsieh￿ s dual TFP. Numbers
may not add up due to rounding. Column (2) covers 1971-1991 for Hong Kong.
35Table 2: Estimation of Capital and Pro￿t Shares,1970-1990
(Except where indicated, all entries are percent per year)
Notes: Line 1 shows the capital shares used by Young (1995, 1998) and also by Hsieh (2002). Line 3 is calculated as a
weighted average of Sarel￿ s (1997) capital share estimates, with the weights determined by the industry-share of GDP
(1-digit SIC from the CEIC database). Line 7, the estimated pro￿t share of revenues, is calculated as
(1 ￿ sL￿￿)=(1 ￿ ￿) , where ￿ is the capital share of cost shown in line 3. (In line 8, since Taiwan￿ s pro￿t rate
was negative and becoming more negative, we report the average change in the pro￿t rate divided by the absolute value
of the mean pro￿t rate.) Finally, the capital share in revenues (line 5) is equal to Young￿ s capital share (line 1) minus
the estimated pro￿t share (line 7). Numbers may not add up due to rounding.
36Table 3: Benchmark Calibration Results and Robustness Checks
(Except where indicated, all entries are percent per year)
Notes: Benchmark calculated using methodology described in Section 4. Aggregate technology calculated from sectoral
technologies as b a= !Ub aU + !Fb aF . Column (2) includes Hsieh￿ s ROE-based measurement of the cost of capital in the
average used to generate b rU. Column (3) increases the ratio of favored to unfavored capital from 2.1 to 4. Column (4)
halves the aggregate pro￿t share by arbitrarily increasing the capital share of costs (taken from international data) by 9
percentage points in every 1-digit sector. Column (5) halves the aggregate pro￿t share by arbitrarily increasing the labor
share of revenue estimate used in both the primal and dual by 8 percentage points. Numbers may not add up due to rounding.
37Table 4: Decomposing the Sources of Di⁄erence in Primal and Dual Estimates
(Except where indicated, all entries are percent per year)
Notes: Sample periods are adjusted to match Hsieh (2002). Lines (1b) and (2b) are the averages across the di⁄erent
measures reported by Hsieh (for which sample periods occasionally di⁄er slightly). For Singapore, Young￿ s primal data
are taken from updated ￿gures in Young (1998), other data are derived from Young (1995, Tables V, VII, and IX).
Young￿ s tables include data by subperiod for b y, b l, b k, sL and sK; we derive (implicit) growth in real factor prices
from b w=b sL+b y￿b l and b r=b sk+b y￿b k. We use a weighted average of growth rates over subperiods to
adjust Young￿ s numbers to cover the identical time period as each of Hsieh￿ s measures (e.g., for a measurement of the
1973-1990 rate, we would take 7/17 of the 1970-1980 rate and add it to 10/17 of the 1980￿ 1990 rate). The periods
are all highly similar and approximately cover 1970 ￿1990. When original growth rate calculations are needed (i.e.
growth of average labor share), the best approximation to end points are used (i.e. for 1975-1990 growth rates, the
calculation might use the 10-year growth from the average during the 1970-1980 period to that during 1980-1990). For
Taiwan, data exclude agriculture and include Young￿ s adjustment of public sector output. Numbers may not add up
due to rounding.
38Table 5: Contributions to the Di⁄erence in Primal and Dual Estimates for Singapore
(Except where indicated, all entries are percent per year)
Notes: Using the calculations in Tables 2 and 3, plus the disaggregation of the capital-payments contribution
to the dual-primal gap in equation (13), and ￿nally taking into account the gap attributable to the tax
correction, we calculate lines 1 through 4 above. Numbers may not add up because of rounding.
39Table 6: Contribution of Corporate Taxes to the User Cost
Notes: The top line shows the estimated growth rate in the aggregate tax adjustment. The second line
shows the contribution to the dual-primal gap.
40Figures
Figure 1A: Statutory Tax Rate and Average Rates Paid
Figure 1B: Average Rates Paid for Di⁄erent Firms
Notes: Sources are Inland Revenue Authority (various years) and Department of Statistics, Singapore (1992b, 1995,
and 2006). See Appendix B for more information on data sources, including foreign manufacturing rate.
41Appendix A: Aggregation, TFP, and Technology
This appendix derives the relationships in section 2 on sectoral and aggregate TFP and technology
in a two-sector economy.37
We begin by discussing the Divisia index for aggregate output: b y ￿ !Fb yF + !Ub yU, where the
nominal output share of sector i is !i ￿ PiYi=(PFYF + PUYU) ￿ PiYi=PY . With this de￿nition, a
change in sectoral output translates into a change in aggregate output by an amount that depends
on relative prices. To see this, suppose that, say, favored output rises. The change in the level
of aggregate output is dY = Y b y = (PF=P)dYF: Since purchasers￿marginal rates of substitution
depend on relative prices, the Divisia aggregate is thus a very natural measure of output in most
models.38
Using the Divisia index, we can now write aggregate TFP growth as:





b ai + ￿ib ki + (1 ￿ ￿i)b li
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￿ sLb l ￿ (1 ￿ sL)b k (A1)












!i (1 ￿ ￿i)b li ￿ sLb l
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The last term in parentheses is a weighted average of the contribution of labor to output in the
two sectors, minus aggregate labor growth multiplied by labor￿ s aggregate share. Aggregate labor
growth, in turn, is ^ l =
P
j=F;U (Lj=(LF + LU) ^ lj We can write that last term out and rearrange as:
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i=F;U











The term on the right-hand-size of (A2) corresponding to i = U is zero because, with no pure pro￿ts
in the unfavored sector, PUYU = RUKU+wLU. For the i = F term, note that PFYF=(RFKF + wLF) =
1 + ￿F=(RFKF + wLF), so the overall expression simpli￿es considerably:
X
i=F;U
!i (1 ￿ ￿i)b li ￿ sLb l = (1 ￿ ￿F)s￿b lF. (A3)
Note that we have used the assumption that all pro￿ts are in the favored sector, so ￿ = ￿F.
In essence, the only reason the aggregate estimate sLb l di⁄ers from the share-weighted output
contribution of the individual sectors is because of pro￿ts, which occur only in the favored sector.
Now consider the ￿rst, capital-growth-related, term in parenthesis in the second line of equa-
tion (A1). Noting that 1 ￿ sL = sK + s￿ and R =
P
(Ki=K)Ri (which implies Ri ￿ R =
37Basu and Fernald (2001, 2002) provide related derivations and discussion.
38In discrete time, the Tornquist approximation to the Divisia index is fairly natural, where growth rates are
measured as log-changes, and shares are measured as the average in periods t ￿ 1 and t. Many statistical agencies
use chain-aggregated output, which is also a discrete-time analogue of the Divisia index.
42(K￿i=K)(Ri ￿ R￿i) for i = F;U), we can express this term as:
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i=F;U
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￿







b kF ￿ b kU
￿
: (A4)
Combining (A1), (A3), and (A4), we have equation (7) in section 3.3: TFP = b a+s￿
￿
b xF ￿ b k
￿
+￿K.
Thus, revenue-share-weighted TFP growth di⁄ers from technology growth because of two terms￿
one which re￿ ects pro￿ts and one which re￿ ects reallocations of capital across uses.
The pro￿ts term, s￿
￿
b xF ￿ b k
￿
, looks unusual, since it is the di⁄erence between favored input
growth and aggregate capital growth. But it re￿ ects the net e⁄ect of two ways in which pro￿ts
coming from markups a⁄ect aggregate TFP growth. First, with markups, a factor￿ s output elasticity
in the favored sector exceeds its share in revenue (see, e.g., equation (1)); hence, we do not fully
account for the productive contribution of favored inputs; the undermeasurement is s￿b xF. Second,
standard TFP subtracts o⁄ (sK + s￿)b k, and the s￿b k portion does not represent payments that
correspond to capital￿ s productive contribution to output.
The capital reallocation term re￿ ects the fact that, for any given markups, the equilibrium
marginal product is higher if the user cost is higher. Hence, if we shift capital from sectors with
low user costs to sectors with high user costs, productivity rises.
Using a cost-share-weighted aggregate residual would change the form of these terms, but would
not eliminate them. Let !C
i ￿ Costi=Cost = (RiKi + WLi)=(RK + WL) be the share of sector i
in cost. Note that ￿ = !C
F￿F +!C
U￿U and 1￿￿ = !C
F(1￿￿F)+!C
U(1￿￿U). It is straightforward
to show that cost-share-weighted aggregate inputs equals cost-share-weighted sectoral inputs, plus
a capital reallocation term:
(1 ￿ ￿)b l + ￿b k = !C
Fb xF + !C
Ub xU ￿ (1 ￿ s￿)
￿1 ￿K
The capital reallocation term is a scaled-up version of the reallocation term from the standard
residual; the scaling factor (1 ￿ s￿)
￿1 = PY=Cost re￿ ects that cost-weighted inputs use cost rather
than revenue as their base. But aggregate output (appropriately) is measured using relative prices,
not relative costs. Noting that !C
U = 1 ￿ !C
F and !U = 1 ￿ !F, it follows that:
b y ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)b l ￿ ￿b k = !Fb yF + !Ub yU ￿ !C
Fb xF ￿ !C
Ub xU + (1 ￿ s￿)
￿1 ￿K
= b a + (!F ￿ !C
F)(b xF ￿ b xU) + (1 ￿ s￿)
￿1 ￿K
The ￿rst reallocation term, (!F ￿ !C
F)(b xF ￿ b xU) represents a shift among sectors where the pro￿t
rate di⁄ers, since pro￿ts drive a wedge between shares in revenue and shares in cost. In the special
case where only the favored sector earns pro￿ts, this wedge (!F ￿ !C
F) = s￿!C
U = s￿!U=(1 ￿ s￿).
Intuitively, pro￿ts create a wedge between the revenue and cost shares; but if the unfavored sector
is small (as measured by !C
U), then the favored sector is already most of revenue and cost￿ ￿ so the
43wedge between !F and !C
F has to be small.
This pro￿ts reallocation term is positive (pushing up the cost-based residual relative to tech-
nology) if inputs are reallocated toward the favored sector. Economically, this re￿ ects that output
is measured using relative market prices, not relative costs of production. With di⁄erential pro￿t
rates, relative prices need not equal relative costs of production (i.e. the marginal rate of sub-
stitution is not equal to the marginal rate of transformation). Output is (quite appropriately)
aggregated using prices, which are equated to marginal rates of substitution, not using marginal
rates of transformation.
Both the capital and pro￿ts reallocation term re￿ ects reallocations of resources among uses
where the social values (measured by prices) of marginal products are di⁄erent.
Appendix B: Data Sources and Discussion
This appendix corroborates key measures that we use from previous authors and the national
accounts, and details our construction of additional data series.
Con￿rming Singapore￿ s Labor Share
To verify the labor share ￿gures used by Young (1994) and Hsieh (2002), we used the GDP by
income components data from Singapore Statistics. These data were produced for the ￿rst time
in the late 1990s, so they were not available when Young did his work; they are available only
back to 1980. We want factor shares in output measured in prices received by producers, i.e., at
so-called "basic prices." This is a concept intermediate between GDP at factor cost and GDP at
market prices, in that it includes those business taxes that correspond to the use of a factors of
production, such as property taxes, license fees, motor vehicle registration fees, and so forth; it also
includes capital subsidies (which are a form of capital income). Singapore Statistics produces data
on gross value added at basic prices as part of their GDP-by-industry data. Labor income in the
GDP-by-income-components data include wages and salaries (whether in cash or in kind) as well
as pension contributions.39
From 1980 to 1990, labor￿ s share of income averaged 45 percent. This share incorporates all
forms of employee compensation, including employers￿contributions to the Central Provident Fund
and private pension/insurance funds. It does not include unallocated proprietors￿income from self-
employment, which averaged 8 percent of income over this period. Any reasonable allocation of this
unallocated proprietors￿income (such as 2/3 to labor and 1/3 to capital) would imply that labor￿ s
share was about 1/2. Labor￿ s share is often low in developing countries because self-employment
income (e.g., from farming) is not allocated to labor. Gollin (2002) reports that after correctly
allocating proprietors￿income (i.e. self-employment income), labor shares are almost always in
the range of 0.65 to 0.8. In Singapore, the magnitude of unallocated proprietors￿income is too
small to explain the low labor share. The GDP-by-income-component data do suggest that labor￿ s
share might have edged up modestly over time, even as Singapore￿ s industry structure was shifting
towards capital-intensive sectors.
To measure factor shares, Young￿ s ￿gures use the input-output tables, which properly incorpo-
rate all capital-related taxes in capital income (i.e., they correspond to gross value added at basic
39"Compensation of Employees (Employees￿ Remuneration): Payments of wages and salaries, pensions and
allowances by resident producers to their employees. Such payments may be in cash or in kind. Con-
tributions to pension funds (both paid or imputed), as well as various welfare schemes, eg, social security,
family allowance, casualty insurance, life assurance are included as part of compensation of employees." (
http://www.singstat.gov.sg/statsres/glossary/economy.html, downloaded April 8, 2008.)
44prices). In 1990, the input-output tables have a labor share of 44 percent. (Close to the 45 percent
share in the more recently produced GDP-by-income-components data, which incorporate more
recent revisions including minor methodological changes.) Young then imputes wages for propri-
etors and unpaid family workers using micro data. Gollin cites Young (1995) as exemplifying the
￿best approach￿to estimating factor shares (Gollin, p. 467). Despite di⁄erences in data sources,
his ￿gures are fairly consistent with the income-components data.
A few studies have proposed replacing Singapore￿ s actual labor share of 1/2 with a more ￿nor-
mal￿labor share of 2/3. (For example, IMF, 2004) One justi￿cation, as in Sarel (1997), is that
such shares might better measure true shares in cost. In our two-sector model, however, it is not
appropriate to simply use aggregate cost shares ￿one needs to estimate technology change from
the bottom up. (See Appendix A.)
In our view, one needs to understand why labor￿ s share is so low: One cannot arbitrarily adjust
it because it is out of line with other economies. In any case, adjusting capital￿ s share down doesn￿ t
reconcile Young with Hsieh. Young￿ s ￿gures still imply that capital returns fell at nearly 3 percent
per year, whereas Hsieh￿ s suggest that the user cost was about constant.
National Accounts Investment, Capital, and Industry Output
GDP by expenditure data for Singapore were downloaded from Singapore Statistics, via CEIC
Asia. (CEIC is a private data distributor.) These data include detailed investment data, which
we used to construct aggregate capital stocks. In particular, gross ￿xed capital formation data by
sector (public and private) and by type of capital (residential buildings, nonresidential buildings,
other construction and works, transport equipment, and machinery and equipment) from 1960 to
2005 were downloaded from CEIC Asia Database on March 17, 2006. Real investment is measured
in S$2000 prices.
These investment data were used to construct perpetual inventory measures of each type of
capital stock. Depreciation rates follow Hsieh: Residential = 0.013, nonresidential buildings =
0.029, other construction = 0.021, transport = 0.182, and machinery and equipment = 0.138. Initial
1960 values of each type of capital stock were estimated by using the steady-state assumption that
Ki:1960 = Ii;1960=(gi+￿i); gi was approximated by the average rate of investment growth from 1960
to 1965. The average depreciation rate in the economy, weighted by nominal values of capital, was
6.7 percent.
Capital input aggregates are measured as share-weighted growth rates (i.e., as Tornquist in-
dices). The weights are estimated user costs of each type of capital, measured as a constant real
interest rate equal to 0.05 plus the depreciation rate, multiplied by the nominal value of each type
of capital. Growth in this weighted capital input measure is not very sensitive to the assumed real
interest rate.
One-digit GDP-by-industry data for the NIEs are also from CEIC and were downloaded in
February 1999. For Hong Kong, CEIC (and, as of this writing, the current national accounts) only
contains industry data from 1980-1990, so we used industry data for 1970-79 from United Nations
(1979, 1984). (For 1980, shares lined up very closely from the two sources.) For Singapore, we also
downloaded updated data on February 2, 2006. The updated data include owner-occupied dwellings
as a separate industry; rental housing, however, remains a part of the much broader ￿￿nance,
insurance, and real estate." GDP by income component were purchased from Singapore Statistics
(http://shop.asiaone.com/stores/singstat/gdi.html) on February 1, 2006. For comparisons with
the United States, Dale Jorgenson￿ s industry dataset for the United States was downloaded from
http://post.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/ jorgenson/data/35klem.html (October 2002). When
necessary, data are aggregated using Tornquist indices.
45TFP Estimates
Dual data calculations are from Hsieh (2002).40 Primal estimates are from Young (1995, 1998).
To corroborate the ￿gures reported by Young, we purchased the Singapore Statistics series on
multifactor productivity (obtained via email February 23, 2006). The Singapore Statistics ￿gures
are available from 1973 on; the major conceptual di⁄erence from Young is that they do not adjust
labor or capital for quality or composition. Average unadjusted TFP growth was only 0.7 percent
per year from 1973-90 ￿indeed, TFP growth was negative from 1973-1985. These ￿gures are very
close to Young￿ s unadjusted TFP growth from 1970-90. Young￿ s input-composition adjustment
removes about 1.2 percent per year from his unadjusted ￿gures. We also estimated capital services
(adjusted for composition) directly using national accounts data, as discussed above. These ￿gures
are also close to Young￿ s ￿gures on capital growth, and on growth in the capital-output ratio.
Surpluses of Statutory Boards
Current surpluses of seven major statutory boards are from the Economic Survey of Singapore (var-
ious issues). The seven are the Housing and Development Board (HDB), Jurong Town Corp (JTC),
Public Utilities Board (PUB), Port of Singapore Authority (PSA), Telecommunications Authority
of Singapore (Telecoms), Urban Redevelopment Authority (URA), and Sentosa Development Corp
(SDC). Singapore Statistics con￿rmed in personal correspondence on March 20, 2006 that current
surpluses of SBs that produce market output are included in corporate gross operating surplus.
Government Loans and Bank Loans by Industry
Information on Singapore￿ s direct government loans were from the annual publication of Singapore￿ s
Treasury, "Financial Statements." (Singapore Treasury (various years). "Financial Statements."
Government Printing O¢ ce, Singapore.) This publication included a list of loans made to particular
borrowers. For example, for 1974, when Hsieh reports market interest rates that average 10 percent,
the government made (among many others) a 5.5 percent loan to Jurong Shipbuilders, a 5.75
percent loan to Sentosa Development Corporation, and a 6.5 percent loan to Singapore Airlines.
We tabulate these data from the annual publications and calculate a weighted-average interest rate
for each year. After 1979, however, the Financial Statements cease to publish the interest-rate
information on the loans, just the quantities.
Sources for bank loans by industry (showing that only 21 percent of loans to non-bank cus-
tomers went to manufacturing, transport, and communications) are various issues of the Monetary
Authority of Singapore Monthly Statistical Bulletin and Monthly Digest of Statistics. These sectors
account for 40 percent of GDP, according to the national accounts￿GDP by industry data discussed
earlier. In￿ ows of foreign direct investment are from International Financial Statistics.
Pre-Tax Income and Taxation by Industry in Singapore
Provisions for taxes by local-controlled and foreign-controlled ￿rms as well as by sector are from
Department of Statistics, Singapore (1992b, 1995, 2006). These rely on corporate ￿nancial reports,
and also report net income by sector as well as selected balance sheet information.
Hsieh (2002) used assessed corporate taxes from various annual reports of the Inland Revenue
Authority (we thank him for making his data available). These report assessed taxes (which
sometimes di⁄er from taxes paid (see Asher, 1989). The Inland Revenue and corporate-sector data
track reasonably well, but note that we do not expect them to track perfectly. For example, total
40Downloaded on June 13, 2003 from http://www.wws.princeton.edu/chsieh.
46corporate-reported net earnings include ￿rms that make losses, and hence owe no tax; this raises
the average rate paid, especially in recessions. In contrast, the Inland Revenue measure of assessed
income is for ￿rms owing tax, not for all ￿rms, so it excludes this source of volatility. In addition,
corporate net income uses accounting measures of depreciation whereas assessed income uses tax
depreciation.
For U.S. multinationals, we thank Ariel Burstein for providing cross-country average-tax-rate
data in summary form. For additional data on U.S. MNC operations in Singapore, we used the Bu-
reau of Economic Analysis (BEA) annual survey of U.S. direct investment abroad. Files from 1983
onward were downloaded in March 2006 from http://www.bea.gov/bea/ai/iidguide.htm#link12b.
Earlier data were obtained from the BEA in hardcopy. Desai, Foley, and Hines (2002) have an
extensive discussion of these data. We also used these data to calculate labor￿ s share of value
added for U.S. multinationals, where value added is given by compensation plus net income plus
depreciation plus taxes other than on income and payroll (e.g., motor vehicle fees).
Return on Equity and Net Fixed Assets
Asset data taken from the Department of Statistics, Singapore (1992a). This is the report cited by
Hsieh as the source of ROE data; but ROA data (not ROE data) are found in the report. Numbers
consistent with Hsieh￿ s ROE calculations are found in Department of Statistics, Singapore (1995).
Department of Statistics, Singapore (1992b, 1995, 2006) also includes book-value estimates of net
￿xed assets (NFA) in the corporate sector.
Present Value of Depreciation Allowances
To calculate the present value of depreciation allowances in Singapore, we consider the four major
types of non-residential capital identi￿ed in the national accounts: Machinery, transport equipment,
industrial buildings, and other construction. (We exclude residences, even for private investment,
on the grounds that a large share of it is owner-occupied rather than business-owned.) Commerce
Clearing House (various years) and Inland Revenue Authority (various years) provide detailed
information on the nuances of the tax code. These sources identify the initial and annual allowances,
as well as the type of accounting required ￿declining balance or straight-line; they identify industries
and activities that qualify for accelerated depreciation; and identify selected other incentives. The
major changes over the 1970-90 period are (i) in 1978, initial and annual allowances for industrial
buildings become much more generous; (ii) in 1980, allowances for transport and machinery become
more generous because of the move from declining-balance to straight-line depreciation; and, (iii)
some manufacturing ￿rms were able to take advantage of considerably accelerated depreciation
starting in 1980.
We assume that other construction received the same treatment as industrial buildings. In
terms of (iii), we assume that most "favored" ￿rms did not take advantage of this accelerated
depreciation for equipment, since a majority of manufacturing ￿rms (many of whom were foreign)
already had pioneer status. A ￿rm with pioneer status (and thus a low or even zero tax rate) would
generally prefer to preserve some of the depreciation for the post-pioneer period, when income
became taxable. However, we allow non-pioneer manufacturing ￿rms (producing about 40 percent
of manufacturing value added) to receive this accelerated depreciation beginning in 1980. In the late
1980s, accelerated depreciation for equipment became available to all ￿rms, which would accentuate
the rise in the present value of depreciation allowances relative to our conservative calculation, and
hence would accentuate the decline in the tax-adjusted user cost of capital.
We use a constant nominal interest rate of 8 percent to calculate the present value of allowances
47Di for each type of capital. We con￿rmed that results are not sensitive to using other rates (e.g.,
6 percent or 10 percent), or to using the actual time series on interest rates used by Hsieh (2002).
We do not, in general, need an overall weighted average D. Instead, we use these depreciation-
allowance estimates to calculate a separate tax adjustment Ti;j for each type of capital i, di⁄er-
entiated by owner, j: foreign manufacturing (where tax rates were lower; we also split this group
into estimated pioneer and non-pioneer status to determine whether they bene￿ted from acceler-
ated depreciation) and non-foreign-manufacturing (where observed tax rates were higher, whether
favored or unfavored). Where necessary, we weight these tax adjustments by estimated shares of
capital income. Results are not particularly sensitive to the speci￿c weights, since allowances for
all types of capital became more generous.
Estimating the Tax Rate for Foreign Manufacturing
Department of Statistics, Singapore (1992b) provides summary pro￿t/loss statements for Singa-
pore￿ s corporate sector beginning in 1980. These data have net income before tax (or pro￿t/loss)
as well as provisions for income tax, from corporate ￿nancial statements. These data are available
for the entire corporate sector, as well by major industry, and for local-controlled versus foreign-
controlled ￿rms within these industries. Hence, beginning in 1980 we can estimate the average tax
rate by industry and owner. As noted in the text, these data indicate that the biggest divergence
in average tax rates is for foreign manufacturing ￿rms versus everyone else.
Prior to 1980, only selected data are available, but we can estimate the corresponding rate for for-
eign manufacturing ￿rms. In particular, for the 1970-1979 period, Singapore Statistics provided us
with selected data￿ including tax and income data￿ di⁄erentiated by local- versus foreign-controlled
￿rms (but not broken out by industry). Conceptually, the overall tax rate for foreign-controlled
￿rms (which these data contain) is the share-weighted average of foreign manufacturing and foreign
non-manufacturing. We (i) assume manufacturing￿ s share of net pro￿ts are proportional to their
share of net ￿xed assets￿ and industry balance sheets (though not income statements) are available
from Department of Statistics sources for the 1970s. We also (ii) assume that non-manufacturing
￿rms pay the same average rate as local ￿rms. These two assumptions allow us to estimate the rate
for foreign manufacturing. For the period from 1980 on, the estimated rate from this method is
quite similar to the actual observed rate. We splice the estimated and actual data in 1980. Results
in the text appear robust to reasonable alternative choices, such as using the statutory rate for
non-manufacturing ￿rms, or using the (observed) 1980 value of manufacturing￿ s share of income
within MNC income.
Estimating Tax Wedges for Favored and Unfavored Firms
Sources of tax-rate data and details of the tax code include Fordham (1992), Commerce Clearing
House (various dates), Inland Revenue Authority (various years), and Low et al. (1993).41
Figure 1B in the text shows that foreign manufacturing ￿rms, who were major recipients of
￿pioneer￿status, paid lower rates, which fell from about 40 percent to under 10 percent by 1990.
Rates for other ￿rms￿(whether local and foreign) fell only to about 30 percent. To estimate the tax
wedge for unfavored ￿rms TU, we use the statutory rate and the depreciation allowances discussed
above. To estimate the wedge TF, we assume that foreign manufacturing received preferential tax
treatment, but other favored ￿rms did not (those ￿rms presumably received bene￿ts in other forms,
such as barriers to entry or unobserved capital subsidies ￿ (land access, favorable loans, and the
like) that we cannot account for in our calculations).
41We also downloaded data on May 17, 2006 from http://www.iras.gov.sg/ESVPortal/ct/ct_b.2.2_what+are+the+tax+rates.asp
48Foreign manufacturing accounted for about 1/3 of total corporate pro￿ts and 2/3 of foreign
pro￿ts in the 1980s. We use the average tax rate for foreign manufacturing but assume that other
￿rms (favored or unfavored) paid the statutory tax rate; we then use the capital-and-owner-speci￿c
present values of depreciation rates to calculate the tax wedges Ti;j for each type of capital i and by
owner. Following Hsieh (2002), we ￿t a time trend to each estimate and divide by the mean. (One
reason Hsieh uses this approach is that he can apply this procedure to data that might occasionally
take on negative values￿ such as ex post rates of return￿ where one cannot use logs. But taking
log-changes of the tax term gives similar results.) We then obtain a weighted growth in the tax
wedge b tU by weighting by estimated shares in capital payments. This wedge declined 0.7 percent
per year for ￿rms paying the statutory rate (b tU = ￿0:7).
Foreign manufacturing ￿rms faced a lower tax rate that fell more quickly. In addition, as noted
in the earlier discussion of the depreciation allowances, one signi￿cant di⁄erence for favored ￿rms
was a 50 percent investment allowance introduced in 1980 for non-pioneer-manufacturing, which
was in addition to other, regular allowances. We assume that 40 percent of foreign manufacturing
￿rms received the investment allowance, based on the roughly 60 percent share of manufacturing
production accounted for by pioneer ￿rms. Overall, for foreign manufacturing, the tax wedge
declined 1.3 percent per year.
To construct a weighted b tF, we weight b tForMF and b tU (the observable term for favored ￿rms
outside foreign manufacturing) by estimated payments to capital of foreign manufacturing in favored
sectors versus other sectors. We use net ￿xed asset data (from corporate balance sheet information
in Department of Statistics, 1992b and 2006) to get a ballpark estimate of qKForMF=qKFavored =
0:39, and multiply by our estimated ratio of TForMF=TFavored = 0:95 to construct the weights
TForMFqKForMF=TFavoredqKFavored = 0:39 We then estimate b tF = 0:39(￿1:3)+(1￿0:39)(￿0:7) =
￿0:9 percent per year 42
For section 5, we construct tax as a share-weighted average of b tU and b tF. The calibration in
Section 4 indicates that RFKF=RK = ￿￿=(1 + ￿￿) = 0:60, implying that that tax = ￿0:9.
Although the decline in statutory rates was smaller than the decline in foreign manufacturing
rates, the decline in Ti was still large for ￿rms outside the foreign manufacturing sector because of
the increase in D. The calculations are fairly robust to alternative paths for the capital weight. We
also con￿rmed that qualitative results were robust to a wide range of assumptions about deprecia-
tion allowances. Note that the declining tax wedge is consistent with a rising corporate tax-to-GDP
ratio because corporate pro￿ts as a share of GDP were rising.
Tax Parameters for Hong Kong, Korea, and Taiwan
The main source of depreciation allowances and investment tax credits is various issues of Price
Waterhouse￿ s, ￿Corporate taxes, a worldwide summary.￿For Taiwan, other sources included Price
Waterhouse, ￿Doing Business in Taiwan,￿1989, 1991 and 1996, and Deloitte, Haskings, & Sells
￿Taxation in Taiwan, ROC (Republic of China)￿(1982). Tax rates were obtained by email from
Taiwan￿ s Ministry of Finance (April 2006) and from Chou and Wu (1994). For Korea, corporate
tax rates are from Hyun et al (2000). Other sources were Price Waterhouse￿ s ￿Doing Business in
Korea￿(1992). For Hong Kong, our sources were Ho (1979) and Ho and Chau (1988). We con￿rmed
the depreciation schedules with Hong Kong￿ s Inland Revenue Department. Further details on our
42In principal, there is also a reallocation term if capital is growing at a di⁄erent rate in foreign manufactuing
versus overall favored sectors. We expect that capital was growing quickly in all favored industries, and the nominal
￿xed-asset data do not suggest any large di⁄erences. Thus, the reallocation term is likely to be small.
Of course, between the favored and unfavored sectors, the di⁄erences in capital growth rates and levels of e⁄ective
user costs appear much larger. This is why we de￿ne a term tax as the weighted-average component of the overall b t.
49calculations are available from the authors.
Calibrating Favored and Unfavored User Costs in Singapore
We calculate the average level of the unfavored user cost (as a percentage of q, the price of capital)
as (￿ + ￿ ￿ b q)TU. Earlier in this appendix, we estimated (see section on national accounts data)
that ￿ = 6:7 percent. Hsieh￿ s estimates of the real rate ￿￿ b q averages 4.4 percent (lending rate) or
5 percent (earnings-price ratio). We use 4.4 percent. Our calculation of TU averaged 1.17, yielding
an average RU=q = 13 percent. For favored ￿rms, we now need to take a stand on unobserved
subsidies ￿, which we did not do in our earlier estimate of TF. We adjust ￿ to correspond to
an interest-rate subsidy of about 2 percentage points, which yields TF averaging about 0.83 and
implies RF=q = 9:24 percent. (Note that we calibrate the unobserved subsidy level only to calibrate
KF=K and b kF. As discussed in the text, choosing a smaller subsidy level (thereby raising RF=RU)
would raise the estimated b kF and further reduce favored technology.)
Appendix C: Systematic National Accounting Errors?
This appendix discusses the hypothesis, plausible in principle, that systematic errors in the national
accounts could reconcile the primal and the dual. In particular, Hsieh (2002) suggests that the
national accounts overstate growth in the capital-output ratio by about 3 percentage points per year.
Hsieh￿ s example of national accounting errors concerns output rather than investment: Singapore
uses a low, subsidized rental rate to measure the service ￿ ow from owner-occupied housing.43 This
suggests that the accounts might understate nominal housing, though not necessarily its real service
￿ ow, which rose 11 percent per year from 1970-1990. Nevertheless, suppose mismeasured housing
services caused us to understate true output growth by 3 percent per year from the mid-1960s
to 1990. Then by 1990, true output would have been more than twice its measured level (i.e., 3
percent compounded for 25 years) ￿making Singapore by far the richest country in the world, with
owner-occupied housing accounting for over half of GDP. Singapore was quite wealthy by 1990, but
these counterfactuals seem implausible.44
Could Singapore instead have overstated capital growth by 3 percentage points per year? Sup-
pose there were growing errors in real investment from the mid-1960s on. Like most countries,
Singapore measures expenditure from ongoing surveys of its components. Large errors in the in-
vestment surveys would not be o⁄set by large errors in the consumption surveys. Hence, both
output and the GDP de￿ ator would also be mismeasured (and incorrect when used for the dual).
But Singapore uses di⁄erent surveys to measure GDP from the expenditure, output, and income
sides. If expenditure-based nominal GDP were mismeasured, then there would counterfactually be
a large and growing statistical discrepancy.
Might the investment de￿ ator grow too slowly? After adjusting the machinery and equipment
de￿ ator for exchange-rate changes, the growth in Singapore￿ s de￿ ator rises about 2 percentage
points per year faster than the U.S. de￿ ator from 1970-1990 ￿consistent with Singapore not incor-
43If marginal rates of substitution re￿ ect the subsidized rate then Singapore￿ s treatment is appropriate. But if
subsidized housing is quantity-rationed, then this rate is not the right shadow value.
44Non-housing TFP growth is virtually identical to overall TFP growth. Non-housing output rises 0.1 pp per year
more slowly from 1970-1990 than overall output; non-housing capital grows 0.1 pp per year faster. In addition, labor￿ s
share of income increases by 0.02 (since housing services are part of capital income), so on balance, share weighted
inputs rise about 0.1 pp per year more slowly.
50porating hedonic adjustments into their de￿ ators.45 Hence, Singapore plausibly understates rather
than overstates real investment growth.46
A more plausible way to reduce capital growth is to raise the initial level of investment. In the
1960s, gross ￿xed capital formation averaged 18 percent of GDP; this share rose to 36 percent in
the 1970s and to 40 percent in the 1980s. Suppose we raised the share of investment in GDP to
36 percent for each year from 1960-1969 and then reestimate capital growth. From 1970-90, this
alternative capital series grows 3.2 percent per year less than what the national accounts suggest.
(The 1960 level of capital is benchmarked as I60=(g + ￿), where g is the average growth from 1960
to 1965; this alternative path raises the estimated initial capital level about nine-fold.)
Nevertheless, such an increase in initial investment and capital seems unlikely. First, it implies,
counterfactually, a statistical discrepancy averaging 18 percent of GDP in the 1960s; the actual
discrepancy was fairly small (see Young, 1998). Second, the 1960s were a time of political upheaval
and civil unrest, so the investment climate was not particularly favorable relative to the ￿ 70s and
￿ 80s. Third, Young (1995) uses data on residential construction and retained imports of cement
to extend structures investment back to 1947; those ￿gures do not suggest widespread errors in
the initial capital or investment values in the 1960s. Finally, Hsieh provides no evidence of major
underestimates of initial investment and capital.
In sum, Hsieh has identi￿ed an interesting puzzle. But before relying on the unsupported
hypothesis of large scale national accounting errors, one needs to assess other probable explanations.
45In personal correspondence (March 23, 2006), Singapore Statistics con￿rmed that they have not implemented
any hedonic adjustments to their investment de￿ ators.
46Such an adjustment would increase real capital growth and, hence, reduce primal TFP growth. It also would
reduce the growth in the user cost and, hence, in the dual, since the user cost depends on the price of capital, q. But
it would not a⁄ect the gap between the primal and the dual.
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